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by
Seth Knudsen
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Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in City Planning
 Schools are one of the most important and visible infra-
structure elements in residential neighborhoods, given their large 
physical presence and the social network that they represent.  A re-
view of real estate, sociology, and urban design research suggests 
that neighborhoods and residents benefit in a variety of ways from 
proximity to a well-maintained school of good quality.  Not sur-
prisingly, New Orleans residents have identified schools as critical 
elements in the recovery of their neighborhoods in the myriad of 
post-Katrina planning processes.  In this context, residential re-
building decisions in substantially flood damaged neighborhoods 
may be influenced by the status of the neighborhood school.
 As residential redevelopment patterns begin to emerge in 
spring 2008, the master planning process for the public school sys-
tem is underway.  While the public school system was responsible 
for the education of nearly 66,000 students at 126 campus loca-
tions across the city prior to Katrina, private schools provided an 
educational option for 26,000 other students at 79 campuses city-
wide.  Nearly seventy percent of private school students attended 
Catholic schools managed by the Archdiocese of New Orleans.  In 
contrast to the public school system that has taken nearly three 
years to chart its course for the future, the Catholic school system 
made decisions about which schools would reopen by February 
2006, less than six months after the flood.
 In this study, parochial elementary schools run by the 
Archdiocese of New Orleans are used as a proxy for the public 
school system to examine the effects of neighborhood schools on 
residential rebuilding.  Residential building permits issued within 
half, quarter, and tenth mile radii of parochial elementary schools 
in substantially flood damaged neighborhoods are compared with 
the number of residential lots to calculate a crude rebuilding rate.  
The hypothesis is that neighborhoods around schools that have 
reopened will exhibit higher rates of residential rebuilding.
 The findings do not support the hypothesis, but instead 
support a correlation between the location of residential rebuild-
ing and neighborhood school status.  While overall rebuilding rates 
within a half mile radius of open and closed schools are compara-
ble, most redevelopment activity tends to be concentrated in close 
proximity to schools that have reopened and further away from 
schools that remain closed.  Given the potential of rebuilt schools 
to attract development, school facility planners should work with 
the city to identify which pre-Katrina school locations would be 
most advantageous for post-Katrina development clusters.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Vale
Title: Professor and Department Head, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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 As redevelopment patterns begin to emerge in New 
Orleans in the wake of post-Katrina flooding induced by the 
failure of the Army Corps of Engineers levee and floodwall 
protection system, they are starting to reflect the “free-
market chaos, also known…as every man for himself and 
the devil take the hindmost,” that public officials, like Mike 
Cowan, the head of the city’s Human Relations Commission, 
so desperately hoped to avoid (Russell and Donze 2006).  
The dreaded “jack o’ lantern effect” is in full force.  Rebuilding 
across the most devastated neighborhoods is widely spread 
and uneven.  Rebuilt houses are often surrounded by a 
combination of blighted structures and vacant lots.
 There was no shortage of alternative options floated 
to avoid this outcome during the city’s myriad post-Katrina 
planning processes.  The proposals ranged from a mora-
torium on building in the most damaged neighborhoods 
to incentives and buyouts for homeowners who chose to 
relocate to neighborhoods on higher ground.  Suggested 
implementation timetables ranged from six months to three 
years after the storm.  As the city approaches the three year 
mark, none of these proposals have even been discussed 
recently, much less adopted, and the political climate for 
major changes has all but evaporated.  
 At the same time, in many ways, this outcome was 
born of political necessity.  The disaster occurred right before 
an election season in which the mayor and council were 
all up for reelection.  It was obvious to candidates and the 
electorate that any declaration, or endorsement of any plan, 
that stated that any portion of the city would be off limits or 
unviable going forward was tantamount to political suicide.  
As such, the mayor and council both endorsed the principle 
that any resident had the “right to return” anywhere in the 
city.  Abdication on the part of local government was politi-
cally expedient.  
 Perhaps the mayor and council thought that the state 
or federal government would rescue them from making 
unpalatable decisions.  The state, as the channel through 
which Community Development Block Grant money from 
the federal government would flow, had the opportunity 
to force the issue through rejection of the city’s laissez-faire 
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rebuilding plans, but chose not to do so.  The federal govern-
ment, in addition to the allocation of rebuilding aid to the 
state, could have exercised its influence through substantial 
changes to Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Base 
Flood Elevations and Flood Zones used in the National Flood 
Insurance Program, like changing some classifications within 
the city to coastal, but decided to make only minor revisions.  
There would, of course, have been a political price for officials 
at any level of government and, apparently, no one wanted 
to pay.
 Even advocates of the free market approach 
acknowledge that markets tend not to function well without 
information.  Yet that’s exactly what all levels of government 
have asked the residential rebuilding market to do.  Property 
owners have been left to make decisions with the little 
information they have access to while local government 
has largely been content to wait and see how the market 
responds before it spends any of its limited rebuilding capital. 
For every homeowner that has decided he has sufficient 
information to rebuild, there are several more strategically 
waiting before they reinvest, hoping to follow and build off 
of local government investment in public infrastructure and 
facilities like streets and schools.
 Schools are a particularly important infrastructure 
element in disaster recovery as they represent one of the only 
kinds of physical infrastructure with a social network compo-
nent.  In the aftermath of a disaster, it is critical to repair social 
fabric in addition to physical fabric.  “Urban recovery occurs 
network by network, district by district, not just building by 
building; it is about reconstructing the myriad social relations 
embedded in schools, workplaces, childcare arrangements, 
shops, places of worship, and places of play and recreation” 
(Vale and Campanella 2005, 347).  
 Of course, these social networks are intimately tied to 
the built environment and the physical presence of schools in 
residential neighborhoods is important in its own right.  The 
symbolism of a reopened school in a post-disaster landscape 
does not go unnoticed by residents.  Beth Ann Simno, vice 
New Orleans School Enrollment Pre-Katrina
8,000
(9%)
26,000
(28%)
66,000
(72%)
18,000
(19%)
Public Schools
Private Schools
Catholic
Other Religious and Independent
FIGURE 1.2 A significant proportion of pupils attended private, mostly 
Catholic, schools in New Orleans pre-Katrina.
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FIGURE 1.2 Public and private schools were distributed across the city prior to Katrina with the heaviest concentration in the oldest neighborhoods.
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president of Mount Carmel Academy high school in flood-
devastated Lakeview recounted how neighborhood resi-
dents would “routinely shout out words of encouragement 
or honk as they drive past” shortly after the school reopened 
in January 2006 (Ritea 2006).  In their discussion of resilience, 
Vale and Campanella (2005) refer to this “symbolic power of 
the built environment…as a signal of recovery” (9).  
 Approximately 92,000 students, nearly 20 percent 
of the city’s population, attended close to 200 public and 
private schools at the time Katrina hit.  The New Orleans 
Public School system was responsible for the education of 
about 66,000 students.  The Archdiocese of New Orleans 
enrolled nearly 70 percent of private school pupils while 
an assortment of other independent and religious schools 
taught the rest.
 While each group of schools sustained significant 
hurricane and flood damage, the institutional responses to 
the physical damage and displacement of their students 
were quite different.  The public school system was slow 
to reopen schools and waited over two years to begin its 
master planning process.  The Archdiocese of New Orleans 
was comparatively quick to reopen schools and released 
a complete master plan a little over five months after the 
storm, not long after basic utilities has been restored to some 
of the most damaged neighborhoods.  Independent private 
schools have charted their own individual courses, but each 
Public Catholic
Other 
Religious/
Independent
Enrollment (Pre-Katrina) 66,000 18,000 8,000
Campuses 126 45 34
System Geography City Metro Area Metro Area
Catchment Area
Neighborhood 
Citywide
Neighborhood 
Citywide 
Metro Area
Neighborhood 
Citywide 
Metro Area
Institutional Structure
Centralized 
Divided Centralized Decentralized
Facility Condition 
(Pre-Katrina) Poor Good Good
Hurricane/Flood 
Damage Most Middle Least
Social Network Low High Medium
Financial 
Resources Operations
Property tax 
millage Tuition Tuition
Rebuilding FEMA
Private 
Insurance, 
FEMA, 
Charitable 
Donations
Private 
Insurance, 
FEMA, 
Charitable 
Donations
TABLE 1.1 School System Recovery Dynamics
determined its future well before the public schools even 
began planning theirs.
 The different responses can be traced, in part, to 
the different factors influencing the recovery of public and 
private schools.  These recovery dynamics are outlined in 
Table 1.1.
 Private schools, while facing many of the same issues 
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as the public schools, found themselves in a post-storm 
environment that was slightly more conducive to recovery.  
Because many drew their students from inside and outside 
the city limits, many private schools had a smaller proportion 
of their students displaced.  Facility condition and location 
prior to the storm were also key factors.  On average, the 
physical condition of private schools was far superior to that 
of private schools, ensuring simple negotiations with insurers 
and FEMA and straightforward repairs.  The Catholic school 
system also benefitted from the ability to reassign students 
to schools outside the city limits while its damaged schools 
were being repaired.
 The contrasting approaches of the public and paro-
chial school systems are important as they have the potential 
to influence short and long term recovery and viability of 
some neighborhoods.  It has been well-documented that the 
longer city residents are displaced, the less likely they are to 
come back.  While decisions about neighborhood parochial 
schools have been made, the future of district public schools 
remains uncertain.  These decisions may have already had 
an impact on residential rebuilding in some New Orleans 
neighborhoods.
 This thesis examines the relationship between 
schools and neighborhood recovery.  The research builds 
on diverse literature that highlights the potentially positive 
effects of schools on surrounding property values, perhaps 
encouraging residents to rebuild, and the potentially nega-
tive effects of abandoned schools on social order and mental 
health that may serve to discourage rebuilding activity.  The 
research focuses on the recovery strategy of the Catholic 
school system and its effect on residential neighborhoods, 
in hopes of revealing the ramifications of the long range 
planning currently underway for the public school system in 
New Orleans as well as the role of schools in future disaster 
recovery efforts.
 The hypothesis is that the rate of residential rebuild-
ing activity is higher in neighborhoods around Catholic 
FIGURE 1.3 Housing is being rebuilt around schools all over the city.
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schools that have been reopened than in the neighborhoods 
around those that remain closed indefinitely.  Residential 
rebuilding activity can be measured through a simple ratio of 
building permits issued after Katrina to residential lots within 
certain radii of open and closed Catholic school campuses.  
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are used to perform 
the analyses.
 Chapter Two, The Educational Narrative, provides an 
overview of the educational landscape in New Orleans both 
immediately before and immediately after Hurricane Katrina 
and the flooding that ensued.  State and local leadership, 
with a recent history of unacceptable physical facilities 
and academic performance in public schools, utilized the 
opportunity to change while private schools, which enjoyed 
considerably better physical conditions and academic 
achievement, sought to regain their pre-Katrina form.
 Chapter Three, Schools and Neighborhoods, surveys 
a wide range of academic literature that helps to describe 
aspects of the relationship between schools and residential 
neighborhoods which might be relevant to the post-disaster 
context.  The quality and proximity of an open school 
could affect residential property values in the surrounding 
neighborhood.  The physical disorder embodied in the 
“broken windows” of a closed school could affect crime rates 
and residents’ mental health and neighborhood attachment.  
Finally, best practices in urban design suggest that new 
schools be multifunctional community centers to serve the 
neighborhood.
 Chapter Four, Research Methods, details the rationale 
for focusing on the Catholic school system as well as the 
selection of specific schools and the neighborhood case 
study for analysis.  Given the system’s quick planning process 
and public announcement of school futures in early 2006, the 
market has had sufficient time to react.  Specific schools were 
selected on the basis of substantial flood damage and the 
case study neighborhood focuses on the effects of a central-
ized elementary school on rebuilding in a widely flooded 
area.  The calculation of the residential rebuilding ratio and 
FIGURE 1.4 Reopened schools bring people and activity.
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related Geographic Information Systems analysis are also 
described.
 Chapter Five, Results, reveals the results of the ArcGIS 
analysis of building permit data around opened and closed 
schools.  While rebuilding rates within a half mile of opened 
and closed schools are similar, building activity tends to 
be concentrated closer to open schools and further away 
from closed schools within that radius.  The case study of 
New Orleans East closely examines the experience of a 
substantially flooded area east of the Industrial Canal.  The 
Archdiocese of New Orleans called for a centralized elemen-
tary school to serve students from three separate campuses 
in the area.  This section analyzes the Archdiocese’s motives 
for the selection of the centralized campus as well as rebuild-
ing rates in neighborhoods surrounding the open and closed 
campuses.
 Finally, Chapter Six, Planning for the Future, explores 
the applicability of the Catholic school experience to the 
future of neighborhoods surrounding public schools.  What 
does it mean for the future shape of New Orleans?  Given 
that the city needs to ultimately consolidate development, 
perhaps public schools should be considered nodes around 
which future development may cluster.  This section also 
suggests directions for future research.
INTRODUCTION
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Pre-Katrina Failure
 At the time Katrina hit, the state of public education 
in New Orleans was bleak and well-known.  The public school 
district was responsible for the education of approximately 
66,000 students in the city, but public school enrollment 
had dropped by 26 percent over the previous six years 
while the overall population decreased by less than one 
percent (Newmark and DeRugy 2006, 14).  The students that 
remained were disproportionately impoverished and black.  
One education consultant described the public schools as 
“one of the most segregated and stratified systems you can 
see in America” (Tillotson 2006, 71).
 During this downward spiral, the school district 
chewed up superintendents with questionable track records 
of success in reversing misfortune in large urban school dis-
tricts and spit them out on a nearly annual basis.  The decline 
in enrollment and degenerative political battles between 
the superintendent du jour and Orleans Parish School Board 
were symptoms of a system that, at a very basic level, simply 
failed to educate its students.  Scott Cowen, President of 
Tulane University, remarked that, “New Orleans had one of 
the worst-performing public school districts in the country, 
pre-Katrina” (Vail 2006, 36).  
 The district spent four percent more per pupil than 
the state average, but yielded test results 32-44 percent 
below the state averages (Newmark and DeRugy 2006, 14).  
Standardized testing revealed low levels of proficiency: 44 
percent and 26 percent among 4th and 8th graders, respec-
tively, in reading; 26 percent and 15 percent in math (Hill 
and Hannaway 2006, 2).  Nearly three quarters of the schools 
were rated “academically unacceptable” by the state (Ibid).  
 If the state rated school building condition, it 
would have found most structures to be unacceptable 
as well.  Architect Steven Bingler noted that “The schools 
in New Orleans were considered to be among the worst 
in the country in terms of state of repair” (Sack 2005).  Air 
conditioning had only been added in the mid-1990s.  Mold 
and termite damage had long contributed to a deplorable 
learning environment.  Few facilities met minimum safety 
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FIGURE 2.2 Public school campuses are concentrated in some of the city’s oldest and most historic neighborhoods.
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Public Private
Catholic
Other Religious 
and Independent
Total Enrollment 66,000 18,000 8,000
Percent of System Total 100% 69% 31%
Percent of Citywide Total 72% 19% 9%
TABLE 2.1 Pre-Katrina School Enrollment, By System
and health code standards and some buildings had even 
been condemned (Gewertz 2005).
 The district’s finances, if it is possible, were in even 
worse shape.  Central office employees and School Board 
members had been under investigation by state and federal 
authorities in the months preceding Katrina for corruption 
and fraud and many were indicted.  The U.S. Department of 
Education discovered $70 million in funding for low income 
students had not been properly accounted for (Newmark and 
DeRugy 2006, 16).  
 On the eve of the storm, the public schools were oper-
ating under the watchful eye of the corporate turnaround 
firm Alvarez & Marsal, hired earlier in the year by the Orleans 
Parish School Board at the direction of the state.  The firm 
was working with incomplete, unreliable financial data that 
had not been the source of a clean audit in over four years 
(Ibid).  System-wide layoffs had begun and were expected 
to continue into the fall as the firm tried to correct financial 
mismanagement and an impending operating deficit.  
 The weak public school system led a substantial 
number of families to send their children to private schools. 
Approximately 26,000 children, 28 percent of students, in 
New Orleans were enrolled in private schools prior to Katrina. 
That figure represents nearly three times the national aver-
age and is indicative of the public school system’s struggles 
(Newmark and DeRugy 2006, 18).  Coupled with a strong 
Catholic tradition in the city, the vast majority of these stu-
dents attended Catholic schools overseen by the Archdiocese 
of New Orleans.  Of the 26,000 private school students, close 
to 18,000 -- approximately 70 percent of private school 
students and 20 percent of the city’s students overall -- at-
tended Catholic schools prior to Katrina (Russell 2006).  
 The Catholic school system expanded greatly in the 
early part of the 20th century.  In 1894, Archbishop Francis 
Janssens (served 1888-1897) oversaw the incorporation of 
individual parishes that allowed them to borrow money to 
create and run their own schools (Condon 1959, n.p.).  Soon 
after, Archbishop James Hubert Blenk (served 1906-1917) 
made the promotion of Catholic education central to his 
term.  Archbishop Blenk had a clear goal
“…to establish schools in no way inferior to the public 
ones.  Every effort, then, must be directed towards 
starting Catholic schools where they are not, and, 
where they are, towards enlarging them and provid-
ing them with better accommodations and equip-
ment until they have nothing to suffer, as regards 
THE EDUCATIONAL NARRATIVE
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FIGURE 2.3 Catholic school campuses are concentrated in the western half of the city.
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
0 2 41
Miles
Ü
Legend
¹º Archdiocese Catholic Schools
Streets
Water
Orleans Parish Boundary
Archdiocese of New Orleans
Catholic School Locations
(Pre-Katrina)
  19
to teachers or equipment, by comparison with the 
public schools” (Hill 1964, 94).
He dedicated the rest of his life to the expansion of Catholic 
education to as many parishes as he could through the 
creation of high quality parochial schools.
 Most Catholic schools in New Orleans are parochial.  
Parochial schools are the Catholic equivalent of neighbor-
hood, or district, public schools (Manning and Rogers 2002, 
32).  Parochial schools are owned and run by ecclesiastical 
parishes, the geographic divisions of a Catholic diocese 
(Condon 1959, 4).  In New Orleans, all Catholic primary or 
elementary schools are parochial and function as neighbor-
hood schools.  Accordingly, parochial elementary schools 
closely reflect the city as a whole and generally serve a 
majority black student population with a few exceptions in 
majority white neighborhoods.
 Most secondary schools, on the other hand, are run 
by religious orders and do not draw their students exclusively 
from the parish in which they are located.  They function 
more like public magnet schools and serve students from 
all over the city, and even the metropolitan area.  With the 
exception of a few historically black schools like St. Augustine 
and St. Mary’s Academy, Catholic secondary schools serve 
a majority white population drawn from both within and 
outside the city limits.
 The high quality of a Catholic education is evidenced 
by the results of their nationally standardized test scores 
on the Stanford Achievement Test.  In the years preceding 
Katrina, students in grades three through seven were in 
the 62nd to 70th percentile range with their basic battery 
scores (Maestri 2006).  While these scores cannot be directly 
compared to the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program 
(LEAP) results used by the state to rate public schools, it is 
safe to say that they compare favorably with the majority’s 
failure to attain basic competence in math and English in the 
public schools.  Although there was room for improvement, 
Catholic schools were a preferable alternative to public 
schools prior to Katrina.
 Other private schools in New Orleans were managed 
and operated individually and independently from both 
the School Board and Archdiocese of New Orleans.  Seven 
schools were affiliated with the Independent Schools 
Association of the Southwest, a non-profit voluntary mem-
bership group that evaluates and accredits schools, but does 
not provide any form of centralized governance.  The major-
ity of the other private schools offered a non-Catholic, but 
still Christian, religious education while some focused instead 
on a particular educational technique, like the Montessori 
method.  The schools ranged in size from six students in 
grades K-6 at the Sister Clara Muhammad Islamic school 
to nearly 1200 students in grades K-12 at Isidore Newman 
School.  Like Catholic secondary schools, these schools tend 
THE EDUCATIONAL NARRATIVE
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FIGURE 2.4 Other religious and independent private school campuses are scattered across the city.
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to serve a more affluent and white student population from 
both inside and outside the city limits.
 There is no aggregate standardized testing informa-
tion available for the non-Catholic private schools.  A variety 
of tests are used by some schools while others do no stan-
dardized testing at all.  This group includes some of the most 
successful and respected college preparatory schools in the 
city in addition to small start-up schools with little in the way 
of a reputation.
 Post-Katrina Resilience
 The combination of hurricane winds and post-hurri-
cane flooding seriously damaged the vast majority of school 
buildings in the city along with many of the residential 
neighborhoods they served.  The New Orleans Public School 
System was particularly hard hit, sustaining nearly $800 mil-
lion in flood damage alone to 85 of its 126 schools (Newmark 
and DeRugy 2006, 14.  One hundred eighteen were thought 
to have sustained some sort of major damage (Hoff 2005). 
 Private schools were similarly affected.  Times-
Picayune staff writer Bruce Nolan summed up the damage 
sustained by the Archdiocese of New Orleans in 2005: 
“Because church and community were intimately connected, 
the archdiocese’s damage closely mirrors that of the neigh-
borhoods it serves: Empty, flood-damaged churches and 
schools are embedded in empty, flood-damaged communi-
ties.”  The Archdiocese estimated that its properties (churches 
and schools) sustained approximately $85 million in flood 
damage alone (Nolan 2005).  Independent private schools 
in substantially flooded areas experience similar levels of 
damage.
 Academic discussions about urban disaster recovery 
in general, and in New Orleans in particular, have recently 
focused on community “resilience.”  At a very basic level, 
the term resilience is commonly understood to refer to the 
THE EDUCATIONAL NARRATIVE
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FIGURE 2.5 Both public and private schools were adversely affected by flooding in the wake of post-Katrina levee failures.
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physical ability to recover in the wake of a disaster.  There 
is nothing inherently good about this ability, although it is 
often described in heroic terms.  Negative elements may also 
exhibit resilience in the wake of a disaster.  For instance, pub-
lic schools in New Orleans could return to their pre-Katrina 
form, both physical and educational, and their recovery could 
be termed resilient without implication of a positive result.
 Vale and Campanella (2005) examine resilience nar-
ratives, disaster and recovery symbolism, and reconstruction 
politics in their edited collection The Resilient City.  They 
conclude with 12 “axioms of resilience,” many of which are 
relevant to the role of the education system in the recovery 
of post-Katrina New Orleans.  
“Narratives of Resilience Are a Political Necessity”
 In the wake of disaster and failure, governments must 
enhance and restore their own legitimacy, along with the 
physical and social fabrics of the city.  Most often, disasters 
are used by governments as an opportunity for progressive 
reform to inspire hope in the wake of destruction.  In New 
Orleans, residents immediately demanded reform in public 
education and regional governance for hurricane protection 
in the wake of the storm, making it clear that each would 
play a critical role in city residents’ decisions to return.  Private 
schools with their positive track record, in contrast, could 
simply strive to regain their pre-Katrina form.
 Katrina provided the impetus for a sweeping reorga-
nization of the public education system in New Orleans.  The 
flooding in the aftermath of the storm inadvertently solved 
the district’s financial woes, albeit by grinding all operations 
to a halt and prompting mass layoffs (Adamo 2007, 44).  
The public school system, a long standing symbol of failure 
consisting of decrepit facilities and uneducated students, 
could not be redeemed in the eyes of residents for simply 
achieving financial solvency.  
 Rebuilding the school system as it was simply was 
not an option if the city and state hoped to bring residents 
back.  Desperate to prove that conditions in the city would 
be better than they had been before the storm, the State 
of Louisiana seized the opportunity to remake the school 
system, making good on its pre-storm threat to take over 
failing schools.  In November 2005, the state wrested control 
of nearly 90 percent of the district from the Orleans Parish 
School Board (Vail 2006, 38).   The State Department of 
Education adopted the slogan “Change is coming.  Yes, it is,” 
attempting to preempt a pessimistic response of disbelief 
from residents.  
 The somewhat complex and confusing system that 
emerged that fall was multifaceted.  Control of the schools 
was divided between the state Recovery School District and 
the Orleans Parish School Board.  Each of these governing 
bodies would run some schools directly and charter the 
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others, creating four possible situations: RSD school, RSD 
charter school, OPSB school, and OPSB charter school.  These 
changes were meant to show city residents and the world 
that the new New Orleans would be better than the old.  
The changes in management, along with the renovation 
and reconstruction of school structures, are central to the 
message of hope and progress.  Katrina has been reframed 
by the State of Louisiana as an opportunity for “progress and 
positive change” in education.  
 The resilience narrative extended to the built environ-
ment as well.  The need to rebuild would necessarily force 
basic improvements to the pre-disaster situation at schools 
that would have to be renovated.  In flooded neighborhoods, 
the reconstruction of schools is a particularly symbolic act.   
Schools are especially important as they “represent one of 
the central institutions of planning, physical and economic 
development, and socialization” (Vitiello 2006, 185).  New 
schools are high profile projects meant to show residents and 
the world that the city is coming back stronger.  The Recovery 
School District’s “5 New Schools for New Orleans” initiative, 
based on community proposals for their neighborhood 
schools, will quickly create five brand new campuses across 
the city that will open in fall 2009.
“Narratives of Resilience Are Always Contested”
 Charters quickly became the favored model for 
reopening schools.  Schools with active parent teacher 
associations were particularly anxious to get their doors open 
and chartering appeared to be the fastest way to accomplish 
this goal.  It wasn’t long before the same political conflicts 
arose internally on the Orleans Parish School Board as well 
as between the Board and the state (Newmark and DeRugy 
2006, 17).  Orleans Parish School Board member Jimmy 
Fahrenholz, unlike some of his colleagues, wished it had 
happened sooner: “They should have taken us over a long 
time ago” (Gewertz 2005 “Charters”).  Other School Board 
FIGURE 2.6 A complex and confusing management system emerged as 
part of a sweeping reorganization of the public schools in New Orleans 
after Katrina.
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members feared that the State was simply creating a new 
stratified system.
 Whether things have changed for the better, espe-
cially for the district’s most disadvantaged students, remains 
to be seen.  Praised for providing choice by their supporters, 
selective admission charter schools may not be truly open to 
everyone.  Specifically, critics worry that the schools oper-
ated directly by the Recovery School District are becoming 
repositories for undesirable students.  Are charter schools 
really creating choice for the most disadvantaged?
 To the extent that the Orleans Parish School Board 
and the State Department of Education continued to directly 
control other, non-charter schools, problems remained, 
especially for the Recovery School District.  The school district 
did not seek, nor receive, community input about which 
schools to reopen (Adamo 2007, 49).  Many of the schools 
that were opened for the 2006-2007 academic year were 
understaffed, lacked supplies, and occupied facilities that 
had not been significantly improved (Adamo 2007, 48).  As 
the public school system moves forward with its master 
planning process for substantially damaged campuses, which 
neighborhoods will get to tell their stories?
“Resilience Is Underwritten by Outsiders”
 The resilience of both the local public and private 
school systems has been largely dependent on national 
resources.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
has provided rebuilding funds to both.  FEMA typically 
covers disaster related damage to public facilities.  However, 
given the poor condition of public school facilities prior to 
the flood, it has been difficult to distinguish between poor 
maintenance and flood damage.  The public school system 
has been forced to haggle with FEMA over what they claim 
have been gross underestimates of disaster related damage.  
With no other sources of revenue for major capital projects to 
begin, the school district has been forced to wait to deal with 
many of its facilities.
FIGURE 2.7 Lake Area Middle School will be demolished and rebuilt as a 
technology focused high school as one of  the Recovery School Districts 
“5 New Schools for New Orleans” scheduled to open in 2009.
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 FEMA’s decision to cover a portion of the uninsured 
damage to Archdiocese schools was a hotly contested topic, 
given the need for separation between church and state.  The 
Catholic school system, however, was not entirely dependent 
on FEMA payments to repair and rebuild its damaged facili-
ties.  Through insurance proceeds and donations channeled 
through the national Catholic Charities USA, the Archdiocese 
had sufficient revenue to make facility decisions and invest-
ments.  One Catholic high school even received a gift of new 
furniture from King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (Ritea 2006).  
Similarly, other private schools could rely on their own insur-
ance proceeds and, in some cases, donations from wealthy 
alumni.
“Resilience Benefits from the Inertia of Prior Investment”
 Given the fee simple property system and the 
survival of all property records in the wake of the flood, the 
existing division of property amongst public and private 
owners would continue to govern land use relations in the 
post-Katrina era.  In the case of schools, that meant that both 
public and private schools most likely would return to prop-
erties already owned by their respective governing bodies 
if they were to return at all.  The central question was which 
campuses would be restored.  For residential property own-
ers, the local public or private school, in particular, represents 
the largest and most visible infrastructure investment in any 
given neighborhood.
 For public schools, once organizational planning was 
complete, and enough minimally damaged schools could 
be opened to meet the ever-increasing demand in the im-
mediate wake of the storm, the focus shifted to the long term 
physical recovery of the district’s facilities.  Repair estimates 
for the public schools totaled well over $800 million (UNOP 
2007, 99).  Lesli Maxwell, a journalist with Education Week, 
outlined the questions still facing the system nearly two 
years after the storm as the district began its master planning 
process:
How do you revive a school system when 85 percent of •	
your buildings are in some state of ruin?  
Which schools should be fixed?  •	
Which ones should be demolished?  •	
Who will pay the $2.5 billion that officials say it will cost to •	
fix the buildings worth saving and to build new schools 
to replace those that are not?
 Along the way, the district will have to deal with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s reimbursement 
process that is designed to physically recreate exactly what 
existed prior to the disaster – change, in fact, is disincentiv-
ized (Maxwell 2007 “Ruins”).  Added to the “inertia of prior 
investment,” there is a strong current to rebuild the system, at 
least physically, exactly the way it was.  
 The private schools face a similar dilemma.  Insurance 
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proceeds, much like FEMA grants, are calculated for a one to 
one replacement.  While insurance allows for more freedom 
in spending the funds, there is a financial disincentive to pur-
sue something other than repair because of the protection 
provided by the ability to subsequently seek full replacement 
value if the initial payment is insufficient to complete the 
work.  As a system, the Archdiocese of New Orleans might 
see value in consolidating some of its land holdings and 
operations, but for independent and other religiously affili-
ated schools that exist only on a single property the decision 
is as simple as whether to comeback or not.
“Resilience Exploits the Power of Place”
 Neighborhood attachment is particularly strong in 
New Orleans and both public and private schools are an 
important part of neighborhood identity and the tradition 
of neighborhood schooling.  Beyond their physical presence, 
schools represent important neighborhood social networks.  
For parochial schools, in particular, the social network aspect 
ties into the larger religious community that may include 
a larger group of neighborhood residents, including those 
without children.  These networks are intimately tied to the 
physical school structures.
 The parochial schools had a distinct advantage, as 
they were able to maintain their social networks while the 
buildings were under repair by keeping many of their stu-
dents within the Archdiocese system, even if it was outside 
the city limits.  The Archdiocese school system extends well 
beyond Orleans civil parish to many suburban areas where 
many of their facilities were unaffected by the storm.  
 While students were dislocated, great efforts were 
made to keep them in Catholic schools.  In suburban New 
Orleans and Baton Rouge, Catholic schools altered their 
traditional operations to accommodate additional students.  
Single sex campuses became co-educational and platoon 
systems were initiated to allow twice as many students to 
use campuses on a temporary basis.  By the end of 2005, 
65 percent of their opening day student body was back in 
school somewhere within the Archdiocese of New Orleans 
and nearly 80 percent were attending Catholic schools in 
Louisiana (Hill and Hannaway 2006, 2).  As facilities within the 
city were repaired, students could easily transfer back to their 
home schools.  By the end of 2006, nearly Catholic school 
enrollment in the city was at 90 percent of pre-Katrina levels 
(UNOP 2007, 45).
 Successful public schools that enjoyed strong parent 
and neighborhood involvement before the storm were able 
to build off their existing social network to locate parents and 
students and submit charter applications that allowed the 
schools to continue operating, even if it was from temporary 
quarters in another neighborhood.  The maintenance of the 
school as an institution is a direct result of neighborhood 
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social networks and will likely lead to the physical restoration 
of the campus.
“Resilience Casts Opportunism as Opportunity”
 For the public schools, in particular, the post-Katrina 
flood presented an opportunity for dramatic changes to the 
public school system.  On the one hand, the charter school 
agenda, which might have been received very differently 
under another set of circumstances, was given the benefit of 
the doubt for its potential to dramatically and immediately 
improve a system that had, euphemistically, underachieved 
prior to the storm.
 The Recovery School District and Orleans Parish 
School Board essentially became charter authorizers in the 
absence of substantial opposition (Tillotson 2006, 70).  By 
end of 2005-2006 school year, nearly 70 percent of New 
Orleans public school students were enrolled in charter 
schools (Newmark and DeRugy 2006, 14).  That number 
declined as the need for schools increased and the number 
of suitable charter operators was exceeded.  However, by end 
of 2006-2007 school year, nearly 60 percent of students were 
still in charter schools (Maxwell 2007).  
 New Orleans quickly surpassed the 25 percent charter 
enrollment of Dayton, Ohio and the District of Columbia to 
become the charter school capital of the United States.  The 
long term implications of the post-Katrina charter school 
movement in New Orleans are unclear, but, to the extent 
that it’s different from the system it replaced, it is generally 
viewed as an improvement.
Charter school advocates nationwide are watching the 
situation closely in hopes of bolstering the case for charter 
schools in other communities.
“Resilience Entails More than Rebuilding”
 Of course, the recovery and reconstruction of the built 
environment is meaningless without the return of the popu-
lation to inhabit it.  The reconstruction of the built environ-
ment is necessary, but insufficient to ensure the recovery of 
a place.  Yet, in some cases, the two components are hard to 
separate.  Schools, in particular, are one of the pieces of the 
built environment that may need to be present before you 
can convince citizens to return.  As Professor Mickey Lauria 
of Clemson University has noted, the city “can’t deal with 
the human problem if the schools aren’t there” (Lang and 
Danielsen 2006, 248).
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 Recovery Planning
 Stephen Villavaso, whose firm Villavaso and Associates 
oversaw production of part of the Unified New Orleans Plan, 
has described what he calls the “Holy Trinity of Rebuilding”: a 
job, a house, and a place to send your kids to school.  These 
three elements are critical in convincing families to move 
back to New Orleans.  Hill and Hannaway (2006) believed that 
schools would follow the first two elements, stating that “…in 
the first three years or so after the hurricane, K-12 education 
in New Orleans will be a trailing phenomenon, dependent on 
how fast the economy and housing are rebuilt.”  
 The public school district was simply overwhelmed at 
first.  William Roberti, managing director of Alvarez & Marsal’s 
operations in New Orleans, wanted to get a handle on the 
situation before he made any commitments: “The first prior-
ity is to get a physical assessment of the situation and how 
long it’s going to take us to be able to get the system back up 
and running to support children, and teaching and learning” 
(Gewertz 2005).  The initial conclusion was that most schools 
wouldn’t reopen for at least a year (Newmark and DeRugy 
2006, 16).  
 The split into locally-run, state-run, and semi-
autonomous charter school systems did not advance the 
cause of comprehensive facility planning.  Benjamin Franklin 
Elementary School, in Uptown New Orleans, was the first to 
reopen its doors on November 28 (Gewertz 2005 “Reopens”).  
Schools open thereafter on an as-needed basis, as suitable 
facilities became available.  The most devastated campuses 
remained untouched while negotiations with FEMA con-
tinued.  By far the largest operator of public schools, the 
state-run Recovery School District, did not begin its master 
planning process until fall 2007 with a projected completion 
date of May 2008, 33 months after the storm.  
 One could fault the city and state for waiting so long 
to begin the process, but the decision to wait, if indeed one 
was made, is logical.  Assertions that “The size, location, and 
composition of the student population is likely to shift from 
year to year, as neighborhoods are rebuilt and different parts 
of the local economy revive” seem inherently rational and 
necessarily lead to a substantial waiting period (Hill and 
Hannaway 2006, 3).  Further, the same authors suggest that 
New Orleans 
 will and should be slow to commit funds to a fixed set  
 of school buildings.  It may find that the life cycles of 
 school buildings do not match family residence and
 employment patterns, so that neighborhoods full of
 children when new facilities are built have few 
 children only 10 years later, when the buildings still
 are relatively new (Hill and Hannaway 2006, 11).
In light of this reasoning, the actions of the Archdiocese of 
New Orleans seem particularly notable.  As an alternative 
to the public school system, primary educational needs in 
the city have long been met by the Catholic school system.  
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Parochial schools in New Orleans served close to 50,000 
students from the city and the surrounding metropolitan 
area prior to the storm.  Like the public school system, 
many of its campuses were severely flooded and insurance 
proceeds were insufficient to cover all the damage.  The 
future was uncertain, but locational decisions about which 
churches and school campuses would be rebuilt and reopen 
were made less than six months after the storm.  
 Unlike its public school counterparts, the Archdiocese 
moved quickly to reopen undamaged and moderately 
damaged facilities.  Cathedral Academy in the French Quarter 
reopened October 9, 2005 and was the first elementary 
school to reopen in the city (Nolan 2005).  The Archdiocese 
went on to open one other school in October and six more 
in November, before any public schools reopened (Newmark 
and DeRugy 2006, 18).
 While all of the immediate temporary accommoda-
tions for displaced students were being worked out, a slightly 
longer term planning process for parish schools and church-
es was undertaken almost concurrently.  Reverend Michael 
Jacques of St. Peter Claver Church coordinated a process 
that focused on proposals advanced by the seven severely 
damaged deaneries (geographic grouping of parishes) in the 
Archdiocese (Finney 2006).
 The primary outcome of the education plan was a 
proposal for a new system of central elementary schools.  
In most cases, one elementary school campus would serve 
students of three or more parish schools.  Superintendent 
Rev. William Maestri characterized it as “challenging because 
it’s going to require some of our schools to begin thinking of 
themselves as serving in a different way than they previously 
had served” (Finney 2006).  The changes were striking.  In 
many cases, parish religious and educational life would con-
tinue to exist, but in separate locations.  The centralization 
also meant that many areas would lose their neighborhood 
school and all of its associated benefits.
 Operations were generally centralized on campuses 
FIGURE 2.8 St. Leo the Great School in Gentilly is one of several minimally 
damaged elementary schools that have been designated to serve 
students from more substantially damaged parochial schools.
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FIGURE 2.9 The centralized elementary school system generally shifts students from substantially damaged schools to minimally 
damaged campuses closer to the center of the city.
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that had sustained the least flood damage.  Typically these 
central campuses were closer to the city center than the 
schools being consolidated.  In New Orleans East, however, a 
substantially damaged campus in the geographic center of 
the area east of the Industrial Canal was chosen over another 
campus closer to the city center that sustained little hur-
ricane damage.
 Although the other substantially flooded campuses 
were temporarily closed, Catholic school officials promised 
to monitor the situation and continue to reopen schools as 
the situation warranted.  “The plan is to open key schools, 
and once they overflow with students, then open the next 
available school,” said Superintendent Maestri (Nolan 2005).  
Given the Archdiocese’s financial situation, and uncertain 
repopulation of the city, it was unlikely that any other schools 
would reopen in the short term.  The “pastoral plan” was 
designed to be revisited as a whole eighteen months later.  
 Jim Meza, dean of the College of Education at the 
University of New Orleans, was skeptical that the lower-
tuition parochial schools reopened in the most damaged and 
depopulated neighborhoods would survive (Waller 2006).  
All indications are that they have.  The Archdiocese does not, 
however, have plans to open any more in the immediate 
future.  The promised update to the 2006 Pastoral Plan, 
released exactly twenty six months after the original in April 
2008, proposed no changes to the operations of parochial 
FIGURE 2.10 Students from St. Mary of the Angels School in the Upper 
Ninth Ward now attend St. Peter Claver School in Treme. The Archdiocese 
of New Orleans continues to maintain the structure which provides shade 
for local residents.
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schools in New Orleans.
 As evidenced by the axioms of resilience, the recovery 
of facilities is a necessary but insufficient element in recovery 
from a disaster.  In New Orleans, a narrative of resilience for 
schools in general, and public schools in particular, is critical 
in signaling to residents and the rest of the world that the 
city is moving forward.  The private schools had an easier 
goal and job rebuilding what existed prior to the storm.  The 
delay for planning the long term future of public schools 
may not have been necessary, but it certainly created an 
opportunity to study the effects of rebuilding schools on the 
recovery of the residential neighborhoods city and to plan 
accordingly.
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 There is no literature specifically dedicated to the 
role of schools in residential neighborhood recovery after 
a disaster.  There is, however, relevant research to be found 
in the fields of real estate, sociology, and urban design that 
helps define the relationship between schools and neighbor-
hoods that might be relevant in a post-disaster rebuilding 
environment.  The present and expected future situation 
surrounding schools and substantially flooded areas seems 
to exist at the crossroads of these literatures.  The current 
research in each of these fields is reviewed in summary in this 
brief introduction and then followed up by a more in depth 
review and discussion of lessons for rebuilding schools in 
post-Katrina New Orleans.
 Real estate researchers have investigated the 
relationship between the quality and proximity of schools 
and residential property values in the surrounding neighbor-
hood.  Schools generally have a positive effect on property 
values in the immediate area.  For devastated residential 
property owners in New Orleans, the return of the neighbor-
hood school has more than symbolic value.  Its return may 
help surrounding properties regain some of their pre-storm 
value which is especially important for homeowners, but 
also relevant for landlords who may be able to charge higher 
rents.  In either case, reopening a school could be interpreted 
as a stimulus for rebuilding.
 Sociologists have been investigating the effects of 
“broken windows,” a specific example of physical disorder, on 
surrounding neighborhoods for over a quarter century now.  
In many ways, flood damaged neighborhoods resemble 
disinvested urban areas in their physical form.  Buildings are 
abandoned, lots are overgrown, and the streets are littered 
with debris.  Many flood damaged schools that have not 
reopened, even those that are supposedly being maintained, 
exhibit broken windows, or worse.  Some of the physical 
damage to schools was due to the hurricane and flood, 
but post-storm vandalism of abandoned properties is an 
increasingly important issue in rebuilding neighborhoods.  
The physical disorder embodied in the “broken windows” of 
a closed school could affect crime rates and residents’ mental 
health and neighborhood attachment.  
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 Finally, best practices in urban design suggest that 
new schools become multifunctional community centers 
to serve the neighborhood.  Most of this research involves 
schools on suburban fringe as few new schools are being 
built in urban areas, but the community design principles 
are the same and applicable to the future of neighborhood 
schools in New Orleans, as suburban schools try to become 
more urban in form and function.
 
Housing Markets
 Tiebout (1956) provides the basis for the school 
and housing market literature with his hypothesis that 
households sort themselves according to preferred combina-
tions of public goods based on social and demographic 
characteristics.  Most recent studies have focused, specifi-
cally, on public school proficiency test scores, but others 
have examined the market capitalization of other measures 
thought to be proxies for school performance, like a school’s 
expenditures per student, the student-teacher ratio, teacher 
education, experience, and salaries, and student attendance 
and graduation rates.  Of these measures, public schools in 
New Orleans only score favorably on the expenditures per 
student measure, when compared with other public school 
districts in the state of Louisiana.  
Quality
 Brasington (1999), unsatisfied with the seemingly 
unjustified, exclusive focus on test scores, summarizes and 
lays out the various school statistics that are thought to 
influence housing values.  Hedonic models and corrections 
for spatial autocorrelation are applied to housing transac-
tions in six major metropolitan areas throughout the state of 
Ohio to determine “Which Measures of School Quality Does 
the Housing Market Value?”
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 The author concludes that the housing market, not 
surprisingly, rewards high performance as measured by those 
statistics most accessible to homebuyers: high standardized 
test passage rates, spending per student and a low student-
teacher ratio.  In fact, Brasington finds that high proficiency 
test rates and expenditures per student may appropriately be 
substituted for one another.  The other measures examined 
are not consistently reliable proxies, but may be valued by 
the market, depending on the type of statistical analysis 
performed.  
 Brasington and Haurin (2006) revisit the notion of 
measuring school quality after the emergence of proficiency 
tests as the preferred proxy in the literature.  Several authors 
have pointed out the inadequacies of such a measure and, 
perhaps as a result, the authors claim that the increase in 
student achievement over time (value added) is emerging 
as a preferred measure among education and labor econo-
mists.  The value added approach attempts to gauge how 
much schools add to students’ knowledge.  Brasington also 
includes such a measure in his 1999 study.
 The housing market apparently, however, has not 
caught up with the economists.  The researchers examined 
77,000 house sales in Ohio in the year 2000, but did not find 
much evidence of market capitalization of value added mea-
sures.  As Brasington (1999) once postulated, the result may 
be attributable to the availability of information.  The concept 
of value added is a new one for realtors and homebuyers and 
may not have made it into the mainstream, making it difficult 
for the market express a preference.  
 The authors, however, continue to find that profi-
ciency tests and school expenditures per student have an 
effect on housing prices.  In particular, a one standard devia-
tion increase in test scores was found to increase housing 
prices by 7.1 percent.  Proficiency tests apparently remain the 
standard for school quality.
 Lately, studies have attempted to control for 
neighborhood differences in housing prices by examining 
differences in housing values at artificially imposed political 
boundaries, like public school districts.  Black (1999) builds 
upon the standard hedonic model employed by Brasington 
(1999) and others before her by trying to isolate the effect 
of school quality from neighborhood characteristics.  Black 
attempts to control for unmeasurable characteristics like 
property improvement and upkeep by limiting her study 
of houses in close proximity to school attendance district 
boundaries.  
 Drawing from an initial sample of 22,679 single family 
residences, 39 school districts, and 181 attendance district 
boundaries across three Boston suburbs, Black whittles down 
her sample to examine 4,594 house sales within 0.15 miles 
of attendance boundaries.  The Massachusetts Educational 
Assessment Program, a standardized proficiency examina-
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tion, was used as a proxy for elementary school quality.
 The findings show that an increase in elementary 
school test scores of five percent yields an increase in house 
price of approximately two percent.  Black notes that this 
result is about half the increase found in standard hedonic 
housing regressions.  Standard regressions, then, must 
understate the importance of neighborhood characteristics 
and overstate the case for school quality.  
 There is an important assumption underlying these 
results: neighborhood characteristics change relatively 
smoothly across space and do not vary significantly within 
short distances.  Yet, the author notes that the structural age 
of houses does differ significantly across attendance bound-
aries, even if other features do not.  The age difference could 
be interpreted as a proxy for the unobservable house and 
neighborhood maintenance factors and might account for 
some of the variance, although it seems unlikely to drastically 
change the results.
 Weimer and Wolkoff (2001) also look at boundary 
effects in Monroe County New York.  In contrast to Black 
(1999), the authors use non-contiguous school district and 
municipal incorporation boundaries to control for the effects 
of school quality on housing values.  The authors build on 
the work done by Brasington (1999) and Black (1999) before 
them, by controlling for potential differences in public service 
bundles and student cohorts in addition to the typical, while 
varied, attempts to control for housing and neighborhood 
demographic characteristics.  By utilizing non-contiguous 
boundaries, Weimer and Wolkoff are able to separate the 
marginal price increase due to school quality from that of 
other non-school public services.  The authors also look at 
the student cohort through participation in the free lunch 
program.  
 Like Brasington (1999) and Black (1999), school quality 
is measured through student performance on a standardized 
test -- the English Language Arts exam.  The authors utilize 
both a log-linear model and a multiplicative model in their 
statistical analysis and find that raising test scores by one 
standard deviation results in a 1.0-8.3 percent increase in 
average city housing values.  Both a standard hedonic model 
and Black’s findings fall within this range.
 Artificial boundaries, whether contiguous or not, may 
change over time.  School attendance boundaries, especially 
in the second half of the twentieth century, were subject to 
federal desegregation orders and changing demographics 
in both inner city and suburban neighborhoods.  Research 
studying the effects of these changes on housing values has 
recently emerged and might be termed boundary change 
effects, in contrast to Black’s boundary-fixed effects.
 Kane, Staiger, and Riegg (2005), look at the effects of 
school desegregation in Mecklenburg County (Charlotte), 
North Carolina from 1994-2001 through both boundary 
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effects and redistricting.  Like Black (1999) and Weimer and 
Wolkoff (2001), the authors study house prices along at-
tendance boundaries, but also the change in housing prices 
after neighborhood school assignments changed.
 Modeling their study after Black (1999), the authors 
find a significant positive relationship between higher scores 
on school proficiency tests and housing values at the atten-
dance boundary, resulting in a price premium of 10 percent.  
However, they question whether unobservable house or 
neighborhood characteristics are partly responsible given 
that many of the observable characteristics (i.e. number 
of bathrooms, square feet, and percent African-American) 
change discontinuously at the attendance boundary.  While 
also noted by Black (1999), the magnitude of the differences 
found in this study is greater.  
 As for the change in housing prices due to school 
reassignment, Kane, Staiger, and Riegg find a statistically 
significant relationship at the high school level only, with a 
4.2 percent decline in property values when reassigned to 
a school with ten percent more African-American students, 
a 2.3 percent increase in property values with ten percent 
higher median incomes, and a 1.8 percent increase in 
property value with a ten percent increase in a performance 
composite.
 The authors also note that the data used in their 
boundary effect analysis implies a significant difference 
in house prices based on the distance to the assigned 
elementary school.  This may reflect the significance of 
the “neighborhood schools effect” found by Bogart and 
Cromwell (2000).  Both suggest that the effect of school 
proximity, in and of itself, is worthy of further study, although 
it has attracted relatively little attention in the literature.
Proximity
 Guntermann and Colwell (1983) conduct one of the 
most extensive early investigations into the effects of school 
proximity with data from Lubbock, Texas.  Holding school 
quality constant, the researchers look at 1,044 residential 
sales between 1969 and 1977.  The authors analyze both 
the potentially positive effect of accessibility and the 
potentially negative externality associated with being too 
close (i.e. noise, traffic) and conclude that each is statistically 
significant.  In short, household location choices are strongly 
influenced by access and distance to a primary school; access 
outweighs the proximity externalities.  On the whole, larger 
schools are valued more by the market due to the variety of 
functions and activities they offer.
 Des Rosiers, Lagana, and Theriault (2001) update this 
study with data from 4,300 single family home sales near 116 
schools in and around Quebec City between 1990 and 1992.  
Parallel to Guntermann and Colwell (1983), the researchers 
find that negative externalities associated with close proxim-
SCHOOLS AND RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS
 40 ANSWERING THE BELL
ity increase with school size, but max out at 365 students, 
leading to a decrease in housing values up to that point 
before rebounding.  Similarly, housing prices increase up to a 
value-maximizing distance of ¼ mile and decrease thereafter. 
Again, access is found to outweigh the negative proximity 
effects.
 In the 1990s, a Michigan Land Use Institute study 
compared the property values within a half mile of two 
elementary school locations in similar neighborhoods in 
Jackson, Michigan: one campus was open and the other 
closed.  The study finds that over the course of a decade, 
property values appreciate at a 3 percent greater annual rate 
around the open school.  Consequently, property tax collec-
tions likely would be significantly higher if both schools are 
open.
 Bogart and Cromwell (2000) systematically analyze 
boundary change effects in relation to school redistricting.  
They identify three distinct dimensions of redistricting: the 
“neighborhood schools effect,” the “racial composition effect,” 
and the “transportation services effect.”  The first effect refers 
to the difficulty students have in participating in after school 
activities and parents working with the PTA when the dis-
tance between home and school increase.  The second effect 
refers to a family’s willingness to pay depending on whether 
they wish for their child’s school to reflect racial integration 
or segregation.  The third effect refers to the introduction of 
bus service in areas that might not have previously received 
it.
 The authors examine 4,463 home purchases in Shaker 
Heights, Ohio between 1983 and 1994 in an attempt to study 
the effect of a 1987 redistricting action.  School quality is 
held constant while the variables of interest reflect the three 
dimensions: whether the house remained in a neighborhood 
school district, the racial composition of the neighborhood 
school district, and whether or not a student living in the 
house would be bused.
 The authors conclude that the “neighborhood schools 
effect” was substantial, with the loss of a neighborhood 
school leading to a 9.9 percent decrease in house prices.  The 
“racial composition effect” was not found to be statistically 
significant.  The “transportation services effect,” however, 
was found to be significant, albeit at a low magnitude with 
the introduction of bus transportation associated with a 2.6 
percent increase in house prices. 
Lessons
 Schools have an important role to play in the 
strengthening of the post-Katrina residential real estate 
market in New Orleans.  It is clear that reopening schools of 
high quality, as measured by proficiency test scores, with 
higher expenditures per student will be critical to bringing 
residents back.  Returning households are likely to evaluate 
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their pre-Katrina locations, in part, on proximity and access 
to a neighborhood school in the post storm environment.  
Some households may choose to rebuild closer to a school 
that has reopened instead of near and abandoned campus.
 The new institutional structure of the public school 
system may go a long way towards increasing student 
achievement and spending.  However, the heavy reliance 
on charters in place of district schools does not ensure that 
neighborhoods have access to their local schools which 
may instead serve residents from other parts of the city.  If 
this system expands to substantially flooded campuses as 
they are rebuilt, spots should be reserved for neighborhood 
residents to preserve the positive proximity effects on nearby 
residential properties.
Restoring residential real estate values is important for 
property owners – there is no incentive to return to or 
reinvest in a worthless investment.  Reopening higher 
performing public schools will help homeowners recapture 
the value in what had been their greatest asset.  The schools 
will attract and cluster residential redevelopment and higher 
property values will result in greater property tax receipts for 
the city and help to finance the provision of city services in 
the surrounding neighborhood.
 Physical Disorder
 Closed schools should concern neighborhood resi-
dents and government to the extent that they may come to 
represent physical disorder, if they do not already.  Ross and 
Mirowsky (1999) defined physical disorder in relation to the 
overall physical appearance of a neighborhood, specifically 
cleanliness, level of building repair, occurrences of vandalism, 
and building vacancy.  As social scientists Sampson and 
Raudenbush (1999) have noted, disorder “changes the calcu-
lus of prospective home buyers, real estate agents, insurance 
agents, and investors and shapes the perceptions of resi-
dents who might be considering moving” (604).  The physical 
maintenance of institutional and government buildings is an 
especially important signal in flooded neighborhoods that 
will not recover without significant private investment.
Crime
 The study of neighborhood disorder began with 
Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) “Broken Windows.”  The authors 
examined the effects of the implementation of police foot 
patrols in Newark.  While the strategy didn’t reduce crime, 
statistically, it did have a significant impact on fear and 
perception of crime in the neighborhood.  The foot patrols 
effectively elevated the level of social order by enforcing 
mores (rather than written law) with drunks, panhandlers, 
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delinquents, etc.  Also known as the order maintenance 
function of the police, the ability to enforce informal rules is 
especially important in heavily used areas.
 Wilson and Kelling asserted that the social disorder 
often stems from physical disorder, like broken windows that 
are left unrepaired.  “Social psychologists and police officers 
tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and 
is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be 
broken…one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no 
one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.”
 The authors cite a 1969 study in which Stanford 
psychologist Philip Zimbardo abandoned two identical cars 
in the Bronx and Palo Alto.  The automobile in the Bronx was 
stripped of everything value within 24 hours and destroyed 
in a matter of days.  The car in Palo Alto was untouched for 
a week until Zimbardo broke a window to help the process 
move along.  The car then succumbed to the same fate as its 
counterpart in the Bronx.
 In conclusion, Wilson and Kelling remarked that, “The 
key is to identify neighborhoods at the tipping point…where 
a window is likely to be broken at any time, and must quickly 
be fixed if all are not to be shattered.”  Many flooded New 
Orleans neighborhoods are arguably at that point and, in 
many cases, abandoned schools are at the center.
 Many studies of neighborhood disorder and crime 
rates followed “Broken Windows.”  Using regression, most 
FIGURE 3.2 St. Mary of the Angels School has several windows that 
appear to have been broken since the storm.
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analyses found a statistically significant correlation between 
physical disorder and crime rates, but acknowledged 
that other neighborhood characteristics, like incidence of 
poverty, often play a more important role (i.e. Sampson and 
Raudenbush 2004).
Mental Health
 Recent studies have focused on the physical and 
mental health consequences of neighborhood disorder 
that may lead to further deterioration of the neighborhood.  
Haney (2007) studied the relationship between physical 
disorder and mental health.  Using data from Boston and Los 
Angeles collected by the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality 
survey in the mid-1990s, the author utilizes three regression 
models to account for influence of poverty level, health and 
civic engagement, and physical disorder, while controlling for 
age, sex, education, income, and race and ethnicity.
 The study found that perceptions of physical disorder 
in neighborhoods are more important than poverty levels, 
but equal to physical health, in determining resident self-
esteem.  Haney concluded that blighted and decaying urban 
neighborhoods are seen as disinvested by both residents and 
governments and their image is incorporated into residents’ 
psychological makeup.  According to Haney, “individual level 
traits (such as education or race) interact with a neighbor-
hood’s physical conditions and mechanisms of social control 
to send a clear message to residents regarding their life 
chances, the level of investment in their neighborhood, as 
well as their future prospects” (991).
Attachment
 Resident self-esteem may be important at a collective 
level and directly tied to civic engagement and neighbor-
hood attachment.  Woldoff (2002) studied the effects 
of neighborhood disorder on attachment attitudes and 
behaviors, noting that “Researchers…have contended that 
stressful aspects of the local urban environment generate 
weaker feelings about – and social connections to – one’s 
community” (87).
 Woldoff utilizes confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and 
structural equation modeling (SEM) on 1988 Nashville survey 
data, selecting 767 residents across 81 partial block faces. The 
study examines the most severe aspects of social disorder 
(e.g. drunkenness, vandalism, homelessness) and physical 
disorder (e.g. abandoned buildings and empty lots) while 
controlling for age, race, sex, socioeconomic status, marital 
status, children, homeownership, and length of residence.  
In regards to physical disorder, Woldoff found that higher 
perceptions were correlated with lower sentimental (emo-
tional) attachment to the neighborhood.  Perceived levels of 
physical disorder, however, had no impact on neighboring 
or participation in formal or informal problem-solving.  
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Sentimental attachment is particularly important in a neigh-
borhood resident’s decision to return and physical disorder 
may serve as a negative intervention.  
Land Use
 Finally, Wilcox et al. (2004) studied the effect of land 
use on neighborhood disorder.  They focused on the effects 
of adult-centered, business-oriented areas (i.e. shopping) and 
youth-centered, residence-oriented areas (i.e. schools).  In ad-
dition to the neighborhood disorder literature, the research 
built on Jane Jacobs’ (1961) “eyes on the street” principle 
– the land uses were chosen for the pedestrian traffic they 
create in surrounding neighborhoods.
 The authors used data from 100 Seattle neighbor-
hoods and sampled 300 block pairs.  Physical disorder was 
measured through the presence of garbage on street, aban-
doned houses/buildings, and poor street lighting.  Utilizing 
multivariate regression models, the researchers found that 
the presence of schools had little effect on disorder, but 
increase neighboring behavior.  Businesses, on the other 
hand, increase physical disorder, but have no effect on neigh-
boring behavior.  
Lessons
 All of the research on physical disorder suggests 
that all damage to abandoned school facilities should be 
mitigated, whether or not they will ever reopen.  Facilities 
damaged by the hurricane and flood, as well as post-disaster 
vandalism, should be demolished or repaired if the city and 
school system want to show that they care about substantial-
ly damaged residential neighborhoods.  Otherwise, physical 
disorder has been linked to increased levels of social disorder 
in the form of crime.  The New Orleans Police Department is 
already stretched thin and can ill afford the permeation of 
environments that encourage crime.
 The maintenance of these facilities is also important 
for the self-esteem of residents that have chosen to rebuild 
FIGURE 3.3 St. David School is closed, but supposedly being maintained 
by the Archdiocese. The missing section of wall must be troubling to 
neighborhood residents that fear vagrants will move into the building.
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and return to the neighborhood as well as those who have 
left and are mulling a return.  The mental health dimensions 
of physical disorder have been alluded to in the local media 
as well.  Nearly two years after the storm, Times-Picayune 
staff writer John Pope captured the phenomenon in his 
headline “Weeds creep into rebuilders’ heads.”  The post-
storm environment is stressful enough without additional 
signs of physical disorder that indicate that no one cares 
about the residents that have returned.  At the very least, 
the city and school system should lead by example if they 
expect private abandoned property owners to maintain their 
properties.  
 Perhaps most importantly, physical disorder weakens 
neighborhood attachment.  New Orleanians have an unusu-
ally high level of attachment to their communities, but it 
is being tested every day in the post-Katrina environment.  
Physical disorder damages the social networks that are 
critical for community resilience.  The physical and social 
aspects of resilience are inextricably linked – either element 
alone is insufficient for recovery.  The physical disorder 
literature indicates that open schools have a positive effect 
on neighboring, placing schools at the nexus of physical and 
social networks critical to recovery.
 
Urban Design
 The literature on the design of schools mirrors the 
issues faced by suburban school districts as they did most of 
the building during the latter half of the 20th century.  Over 
the last fifty years, public school enrollment has steadily 
increased as the Baby Boom generation and its “echo” have 
matured.  The educational infrastructure has aged along with 
the Boomers.  The average age of school buildings was 42 
in the year 2000.  Unfortunately, rapid deterioration begins 
at age forty (USDOE 2000, 1).  Many of these facilities are at 
capacity and in desperate need of modernization.
 There has been a new school construction boom 
in the last ten years as urban and older suburban school 
districts have been forced to deal with decrepit, overcrowded 
buildings.  New schools are bigger and tend to be further 
removed from the people they serve in suburban environ-
ments that are already low density.  While public school 
enrollment increased nearly 85 percent between 1930 and 
2001, the number of public school buildings serving students 
has decreased 60 percent (ICMA 2008, 4).  This statistic re-
flects the fact that average school size has increased rapidly.
 Tight budgets and minimum site acreage require-
ments promulgated in the 1990s by the Council of 
Educational Facility Planners International made it difficult 
to find suitable sites in already developed areas so school 
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districts have been forced to seek larger plots of cheaper land 
further from developed areas.  In some cases, schools are 
even leading development on the exurban fringe.  
Yet, research on school size suggests that student popula-
tions greater than 800 may negatively affect the learning 
process (USDOE 2000, 1).  These new, large schools are 
typically located far from the students they serve, making 
walking or biking to school impossible.  Increasing occur-
rences of childhood obesity have been linked to this trend in 
school development.  
 The recent movement toward smaller community 
schools reflects the real and perceived shortcomings of 
the large suburban model.  School size and location are 
becoming increasingly important decisions as one of the 
most important infrastructure investments shaping demand 
for growth and development (Lambert and Huh 2008).  
Community schools are typically smaller, located within the 
neighborhood they serve, and may also serve as community 
centers or provide social services.  These facilities are typically 
woven into existing urban fabric and seek to engage all 
members of the community, not just parents and students, 
through multifunctional spaces that are accessible before, 
during, and after regular school hours.  
 The schools are strongly identified with their sur-
rounding neighborhoods, enjoy local support, and foster a 
sense of community ownership.  Community schools are a 
center of neighborhood activity.  Instead of being open only 
to students and during school operating hours, the buildings 
are open to the whole community after school hours and on 
weekends.  The schools house other community uses, like 
libraries, family support centers, and physical and mental 
health services.  The school is then an asset to the entire 
community and a source of pride (Khadduri et al. 2007, 5).
 The introduction of the community school model can 
also be used as a tool for revitalization in depressed areas.  
Indeed, they are most effective when pursued together: 
“Neighborhood strategies must be coordinated with school 
improvement activities in order to be most effective…a 
neighborhood revitalization strategy that includes a school 
improvement component will be more successful and more 
sustainable than a strategy that focuses solely on the neigh-
borhood” (Khadduri et al. 2007, ii-1).
 Creating a new community school in an older estab-
lished neighborhood with a rich history and vibrant mix of 
uses can help spur job creation, attract new businesses and 
educated workers, and enhance quality of life (Lambert and 
Huh 2008).  For instance, community school-centered hous-
ing can help retain and attract families with children, and 
increase residential stability in a neighborhood (Khadduri et 
al. 2007, 6).  Yet, in much the same way as land use planners 
and school facility planners tend to operate in their own silos, 
community development practitioners and school officials 
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often work independently and miss out on opportunities to 
advance their missions in tandem, yielding less than optimal 
results.
 Multifunctional community schools will be especially 
critical in the future as the demand for school facilities de-
clines.  Over one half of households had children in 1950, but 
that number dropped to one third by the 2000 Census and 
is expected to decline even further, down to one quarter by 
2025.  The result will be a smaller percentage of households 
with a direct connection to local schools (ICMA 2008, 4).  The 
potential for community schools is great.  As Vice President 
Al Gore observed in 1998, “These [school] buildings will 
have a profound impact not just on students, but on entire 
neighborhoods” (USDOE 2000, 5).
Lessons
 Reopening schools in depressed, flood-damaged 
areas of New Orleans can be a key part of revitalization ef-
forts.  The schools should be relatively small in size and serve 
neighborhood residents.  Resident access to physical and 
mental health services has been partially limited by facility 
closure since the storm and rebuilt schools offer a perfect 
opportunity to reintroduce these services to the community.  
Additionally, close proximity to school allows students to 
enjoy the health benefits of walking or biking in addition 
to a short commute.  The new or rebuilt facilities should be 
designed as community centers to engage all neighborhood 
residents, not just families with children.  Building a commu-
nity center component into new and rebuilt schools is one 
way of dealing with potential fluctuations in the school age 
population and local economy that Hill and Hannaway (2006) 
believe will ultimately guide development, without having 
to wait for the entire situation to play out.  School facilities 
should be developed in concert with neighborhood plans, 
in partnership with community development and planning 
professionals, even though they are not required to interact 
or work together.
 Due to the poor condition of its facilities prior to the 
storm, the public school system will be forced to build many 
new schools from scratch.  As it develops its master plan it 
should keep these tenets in mind.  The Martin Luther King, Jr. 
elementary school in the Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans, 
developed with a public library branch prior to Katrina, 
is a good example.  Again, if the charter school system is 
expanded to substantially damaged campuses, it is critical 
that spaces be reserved for local residents so the benefits of 
proximity to a neighborhood school can be fully enjoyed.  
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 The research method is designed to focus on the 
effects of the Catholic school system’s recovery strategy 
on surrounding residential neighborhoods, to determine 
whether or not there is a correlation between the reconstruc-
tion of schools and residential rebuilding in substantially 
flood-damaged neighborhoods.  The Catholic school system 
completed and announced its long term plan in February 
2006, approximately five months after the city flooded and 
well before the future of many flood damaged neighbor-
hoods was clear.  Relatively few residential building permits 
had been issued in these areas prior to the announcement 
of the plan.  While there are some structural differences 
between the public and Catholic school systems, the actions 
of the Archdiocese and their effects are a reasonable proxy 
for the public school system.
 The method relies on the calculation of a simple 
rebuilding rate, based on the number of structures that 
have been issued a variety of building permits divided by 
the number of residential lots, each within certain radii of 
Catholic schools that have reopened or remain closed.  The 
hypothesis is that neighborhoods around schools that have 
reopened will have higher crude rates residential rebuilding 
than the neighborhoods around schools that have not been 
restored and remain closed indefinitely.  This hypothesis 
is grounded in prior research that suggests that proximity 
to an open school of good quality has a positive effect on 
residential real estate and that physical disorder in the form 
of abandoned buildings has a negative effect on residents’ 
mental health and neighborhood attachment.
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Selection
School System
 In order for property owners to make a decision about 
whether or not to rebuild, they need information on a wide 
variety of issues including local schools.  Yet, as of April 2008, 
the State Department of Education and Orleans Parish School 
Board have not publicly announced the future of many 
public school campuses that were damaged by the flood.  
Due to haggling with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, many schools were not remediated or secured until 
more than two years after the storm.  In these cases, public 
school campuses have been significant contributors to 
neighborhood physical disorder.  Any decisions to rebuild in 
these areas are necessarily being driven by other factors.  
 If decisions had been made earlier, it would be 
preferable to examine the effects of public schools on their 
surrounding neighborhoods, given the scale of the system 
and its geographic distribution.  However, it would be dif-
ficult to control for the quality of public schools as it could 
vary greatly from one neighborhood to another, even if the 
system was judged to be of low quality on the whole.  The 
transition to a largely charter system is another wildcard in 
the future of the school system.  What comes back to flooded 
campuses may be, and hopefully will be, very different from 
what existed, but that will not be known for some time.  In 
short, the future of public schools in flooded neighborhoods 
has not yet been determined and it would be difficult for 
property owners to even make an educated guess about the 
future of their neighborhood public schools.  
 The Archdiocese of New Orleans, by contrast, an-
nounced which schools they planned to reopen in early 
February 2006 – a little more than five months after disaster 
struck.  While only about 30-35 percent of the size of the 
public school system in both students served and number 
of campuses, property owners in these neighborhoods have 
had plenty of time to react to the information.  Additionally, 
school quality was relatively constant across the system and 
more highly regarded than the public school system.  There 
is no need to control for quality, so it is easier to judge the 
effects of proximity and neighborhood physical disorder.   
 As for the future of the social network represented 
by the restoration of the school, most of the teachers and 
students at the schools that came back are the same ones 
that were originally there, or elsewhere in the system, before 
the storm.  Further, parish schools are often paired with 
churches that serve and represent a neighborhood social 
network as well.  Taken together, these elements make the 
Catholic school system the best case to study the impacts of 
reopening schools.
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Individual Schools
 The Catholic school system in New Orleans consisted 
of 44 schools prior to the hurricane: 31 elementary schools, 
11 secondary schools, and 2 combined schools.  Within a 
year after the post-Katrina flooding, the Archdiocese had 
reopened all of the secondary and combined schools, but 
only 19 of the elementary schools.  The closures, deemed 
temporary, were recently reconfirmed in a review of the 
Archdiocese’s post-Katrina parish realignment.
 Almost all of the elementary schools are parochial, or 
affiliated with a church parish, meaning they are neighbor-
hood based and tend to serve that population.  Before the 
storm, most elementary schools had 300-400 pupils.  The 
secondary and combined schools, in contrast, are more 
centralized and have a much larger catchment area – well 
into the suburbs, in many cases – leading to student pre-
storm populations well over 1,000.  As a result, the secondary 
and combined schools in neighborhoods that sustained 
substantial flood damage did not lose the majority of their 
student bodies.  
 Another factor working in the favor of secondary 
school restoration, related to the population they serve, is the 
scale of their buildings.  Nearly all are multi-story, so only the 
first floor would have sustained flood damage.  On the other 
hand, many elementary schools are single story and were 
completely wiped out and required a much larger invest-
ment on a per-pupil basis.  To date, the Archdiocese has only 
restored one single story elementary school, while nearly all 
the multi-story buildings have been refurbished.  As catastro-
phe losses far outpaced insurance and grant proceeds, this 
approach was an economic necessity.
Parochial elementary schools were chosen as a subset of 
the Catholic schools because they serve a neighborhood 
population and provide a point of contrast between flooded 
neighborhoods where schools were closed or restored.
Refinement
 Two elementary schools that serve special needs 
populations and one middle school that draw their stu-
dents from outside their immediate neighborhoods were 
eliminated to leave ten neighborhood schools that include 
kindergarten through fifth to eighth grades.  The remaining 
campuses were geocoded with ArcGIS on a map of New 
Orleans against a layer of post-Katrina flood depths gener-
ated by the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD).
 Not surprisingly, not all of the elementary schools 
sustained significant flood damage.  Even some schools in 
largely flooded neighborhoods sustained little damage as 
they were in prominent locations along ridges with higher 
elevations than their surrounding neighborhoods.  Flood 
depths at each elementary school in the flood zone were 
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FIGURE 4.2 Four substantially flood damaged parochial elementary schools have reopened while six others remain closed.
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estimated with the NORAD data embedded in the GIS layer.  
Given the potential change in elevation between ground 
level and floor level of schools and surrounding residences, 
2.5 feet was used as a minimum flood depth for the selection 
of relevant cases.  Of the original elementary school popula-
tion of 31, ten schools sustained substantial flood damage.  
Four of these schools have reopened while the other six 
remain closed.  The Archdiocese has been forced to strategi-
cally concentrate its resources into a few facilities, so it is no 
surprise that the majority of substantially flooded campuses 
remain closed.  The cases are well-distributed across the 
flooded areas of the city.
Data
 Post-Katrina permit data, as of February 1, 2008, were 
obtained from the from the city’s Department of Safety and 
Permits on the City of New Orleans Community on One Page 
portal and imported into Microsoft Access.  The database was 
queried to select relevant permit types:
Residential (Addition, Emergency, Homeowner Repair, •	
New, Renovation-Structural, Renovation-Non-Structural, 
Repair, Repair-Replace-Addition) 
Electrical (Construction Loop, Service-Circuits-Feeders)•	
Mechanical (General Mechanical)•	
Certificate of Occupancy •	
These permit types and sub-types represent the range of 
permits applied for in the course of residential rebuilding 
and construction.  Demolitions were omitted as a demolition 
permit, without application for another type of permit, does 
not represent intent to rebuild.
 In many cases, rebuilding projects seek multiple 
permits, resulting in multiple records for each address.  
Additionally, some individual permits are entered multiple 
times.  In order to get an accurate count of properties that 
have been or are being reconstructed, the records were 
queried for only the most recent permit and type issued for 
each address.  The filtered building permits were geocoded 
in ArcGIS.  
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 It should be noted that the fee for a residential build-
ing permit was waived immediately after the storm and, after 
multiple extensions, until June 30, 2006.  There is a compel-
ling argument that residential building permits, especially 
of the emergency and repair variety, do not necessarily 
indicate a property owner’s intent to rebuild.  Many owners 
may have been hedging their bets by applying for permits in 
case they decided to rebuild or to avoid new flood elevation 
restrictions.  Indeed, it is likely that a significant number of 
permits were issued for residences where no work has been 
completed and the permit has expired.  
 However, there is no evidence to suggest that this 
trend would be concentrated in one substantially damaged 
neighborhood over another.  Assuming these cases are more 
or less equally distributed, the GIS analysis may overestimate 
the level of rebuilding overall, but not the relative levels 
between neighborhoods that are the focus of this analysis.
FIGURE 4.3 The issuance of a permit does not necessarily indicate that 
any work is being performed on a building.
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GIS Analysis
 Zoning and lot layers were then added to the file.  A 
residential zoning layer was created after selecting residential 
zoning classifications.  The intersection of the residential 
zoning and lot layers was used to create a layer of residential 
lots.
 Tenth, quarter, and half mile buffers were drawn 
around the ten selected elementary schools to capture 
building permit and residential lot information within these 
radii.  The tenth mile radius was chosen to capture properties 
in the immediate vicinity of the school – those properties 
that may have a direct view of the school from their porch or 
window.  The quarter mile radius was chosen as the expected 
walking radius and distance that maximizes property value 
for school proximity effects (Des Rosiers et al. 2001).  Finally, 
the half mile radius was chosen to more fully capture each 
school’s neighborhood and expected catchment area, with-
out overlapping with other neighborhoods.  
 The intersections between the buffers and the geo-
coded permit data were recorded in Microsoft Excel.  Building 
permits were divided by the number of residential lots to 
generate a crude rebuilding rate around the reopened and 
closed schools, both individually and collectively, within each 
radius.  The same procedure was used to determine rebuild-
ing rates with building permit data before and after the 
public announcement of the Archdiocese’s Pastoral Plan on 
February 9, 2006 as well as after schools reopened in August 
2006.
 Once the number of lots and permits surrounding 
each school was obtained, aerial photographs of the schools 
and their neighborhoods were examined for correspondence 
to the GIS lot layer.  In two cases, St. Dominic (open) and 
St. David (closed), the photos revealed little resemblance 
between the developed condition and the lots on record.  
The lot layer displayed multiple lots per dwelling in these two 
neighborhoods, indicating a development pattern distinct 
from the property records.  As a result, an accurate rebuilding 
rate could not be calculated for these two neighborhoods 
and consequently they have been excluded from the results.
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FIGURE 4.2 Tenth, quarter, and half mile buffers capture rebuilding activity in the neighborhoods surrounding substantially 
damaged parochial elementary schools.
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
¹º
0 2 41
Miles
Ü
Legend
¹º Substantially Damaged (Closed)
¹º Substantially Damaged (Reopened)
1/10 mile buffer
1/4 mile buffer
1/2 mile buffer
Streets
Water
Orleans Parish Boundary
Substantially Flood Damaged Parochial
Elementary School
Buffers
  57
Case Study
 Of the ten flooded cases, one school, Resurrection of 
Our Lord, was designated by the Archdiocese as a centralized 
elementary school that would serve students from other 
schools in the area that had been closed.  Other centralized 
elementary schools designated in the pastoral plan generally 
had minor damage and were selected to serve the students 
from substantially flooded parishes.  
In this case, the chosen school sustained a similar level of 
damage to the other schools it will serve, but was publicly 
designated as a replacement.  All three schools served 
New Orleans East prior to the storm, occupied single story 
structures, and are similarly embedded within residential 
neighborhoods.  The case study will examine the relative 
rates of rebuilding among the neighborhoods served by the 
schools, relative to the overall trends, and speculate about 
the other significant factors in play at each site.
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Aggregate
 Of the eight remaining cases, three schools have 
reopened while the other five remain closed.  Although it’s a 
small number of cases, the geographic information systems 
analysis revealed an interesting trend: while rebuilding rates 
are comparable at a half mile distance from open and closed 
schools, rebuilding rates increase as the radius gets closer to 
schools that have reopened and rates decrease as the radius 
gets closer to schools that have not.
1/2 mile 1/4 mile 1/10 mile
Permits Res. Lots Percent Permits Res. Lots Percent Permits Res. Lots Percent
St. Pius X 179 847 21.13% 100 308 32.47% 41 67 61.19%
St. Anthony of Padua 1132 2066 54.79% 473 785 60.25% 99 159 62.26%
Resurrection of Our Lord 866 1497 57.85% 282 544 51.84% 57 85 67.06%
TOTAL 2177 4410 49.37% 855 1637 52.23% 197 311 63.34%
1/2 mile 1/4 mile 1/10 mile
Permits Res. Lots Percent Permits  Res. Lots Percent Permits  Res. Lots Percent
St. Simon Peter 799 2008 39.79% 164 439 37.36% 0 67 0.00%
St. Monica 873 1920 45.47% 207 734 28.20% 38 165 23.03%
St. Mary of the Angels 1300 2513 51.73% 414 920 45.00% 59 173 34.10%
St. Frances Xavier Cabrini 755 1826 41.35% 198 478 41.42% 32 83 38.55%
Immaculate Heart of Mary 1057 1868 56.58% 160 402 39.80% 39 71 54.93%
TOTAL 4784 10135 47.20% 1143 2973 38.45% 168 559 30.05%
TABLE 5.1 Neighborhood Rebuilding Rates: Reopened Schools
TABLE 5.2 Neighborhood Rebuilding Rates: Closed Schools
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 These results do not support the hypothesis that 
reopening neighborhood schools in substantially flooded 
areas is associated with an increase in neighborhood residen-
tial rebuilding rates overall, at least when measured at a half 
mile radius.  However, these results do suggest that reopened 
schools may serve as a center for clustered redevelopment 
in a neighborhood.  Closed schools, in contrast, may repel 
development in their immediate vicinity.  In short, school 
status seems to affect the location of rebuilding activity 
within a neighborhood, but not the overall rate.
Time Sequence
 The results above do not control for the timing of 
building permit requests.  As such, it is unclear whether the 
patterns revealed by the aggregate post-Katrina data above 
have been created in response to either the Archdiocese’s 
public announcement about which schools would reopen 
in early February 2006 or their visible, symbolic reopening in 
August 2006.  However, a time sequence analysis shows no 
strongly discernible pattern prior to the public release of the 
pastoral plan.  
 Prior to the public announcement of the plan, there 
was little variation in rebuilding activity across the radii of 
interest.  The pattern that emerges after February 9th is 
completely consistent with aggregate data, which is not 
terribly surprising given that the vast majority of building 
permits were issued after this date.  Similarly, the permit data 
for permits issued after the 2006-2007 school year began 
reveals the same pattern, albeit somewhat less pronounced.
Radius
Before 2/9/06 After 2/9/06 After 9/1/06
Permits Percent Permits Percent Permits Percent
Closed Schools
1/2 mi 285 2.8% 4499 44.4% 3052 30.1%
1/4 mi 55 1.8% 1088 36.6% 756 25.4%
1/10 mi 7 1.3% 161 28.8% 115 20.6%
Reopened Schools
1/2 mi 187 4.2% 1990 45.1% 1453 32.9%
1/4 mi 78 4.8% 777 47.5% 555 33.9%
1/10 mi 15 4.8% 182 58.5% 119 38.3%
TABLE 5.3 Neighborhood Rebuilding Rates: Time-Controlled
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Rebuilding Rate Census
Tract Population
School
Age (2005)
Median
Household
Income
Families
In Poverty Renters Owners
Median
Home Value
No
Mortgage1/2 mi 1/4 mi 1/10 mi
St. Pius X 21.1% 32.5% 61.2% 133.01 3630 17.8% $73,229 1.4% 14.4% 85.6% $266,100 48.9%
St. Anthony of Padua 54.8% 60.3% 62.3% 65 3312 19.1% $21,456 31.2% 72.3% 27.7% $85,500 30.0%
Resurrection of Our Lord 57.9% 51.8% 67.3% 17.23 5564 22.7% $39,049 8.0% 14.9% 85.1% $79,100 21.1%
AVERAGE 44.6% 48.2% 63.6% 72 4169 19.9% $44,578 13.5% 33.9% 66.1% $143,567 33.3%
Rebuilding Rate
Census
Tract Population
School
Age (2005)
Median 
Household   
Income
Families
In Poverty Renters Owners
Median
Home Value
No
Mortgage1/2 mi 1/4 mi 1/10 mi
St. Simon Peter 39.8% 37.4% 0.0% 17.38 9931 28.9% $37,120 22.0% 33.2% 66.8% $81,400 6.6%
St. Monica 45.5% 28.2% 23.0% 86 1622 26.8% $11,955 41.0% 18.0% 82.0% $65,300 64.2%
St. Mary of the Angels 51.7% 45.0% 34.1% 14.01 3171 21.2% $19,784 30.9% 41.6% 58.4% $51,700 57.6%
St. Frances Xavier Cabrini 41.4% 41.4% 38.6% 33.01 2818 18.1% $53,958 4.5% 19.6% 80.4% $136,000 37.8%
Immaculate Heart of Mary 56.6% 39.8% 54.9% 17.2 4972 25.4% $36,387 15.7% 36.2% 63.8% $70,500 17.2%
AVERAGE 47.0% 38.4% 30.1% 34 4503 24.1% $31,841 22.8% 29.7% 70.3% $80,980 36.7%
TABLE 5.4 Rebuilding Rates and Selected Demographic Characteristics: Reopened Parochial Elementary Schools
TABLE 5.5 Rebuilding Rates and Selected Demographic Characteristics: Closed Parochial Elementary Schools
Demographic Characteristics
 This analysis does not control for a number of other 
factors that undoubtedly play a role in property owners’ 
decisions to rebuild near a reopened school.  The proportion 
of school age children in the neighborhood, socioeconomic 
status, and the proportion of homeownership are all fac-
tors that might play into the decision and also factor into 
neighborhood housing values and neighborhood physical 
disorder.  A comparison of rebuilding rates and selected 
demographic characteristics by school Census tract in 2000 is 
shown in the tables below.
 This comparison reveals that neighborhoods around 
reopened and closed schools, on average, have similar 
proportions of renters, homeowners, and homeowners 
without a mortgage indicating that property owners have 
similar economic motivations, whether it is to have rental 
income or to recapture their housing investments.
 Yet, areas where parochial schools have been rebuilt 
RESULTS
 62 ANSWERING THE BELL
are generally more affluent, as measured by average family 
poverty rate, median household income, and median home 
value.  However, it should be noted that the neighborhood 
around St. Pius X is one of the wealthiest in the city and rep-
resents an extreme outlier among these cases.  If you remove 
the St. Pius X data from the comparison, the rebuilding rates 
do not change significantly, while the average family poverty 
rate, median household income, and median home value 
join the same range as their counterparts surrounding closed 
schools.  Ironically, the neighborhoods where schools have 
been rebuilt would be expected to have a smaller school age 
population, assuming the same households returned.
 While these tables do not provide an exhaustive 
comparison of other neighborhood characteristics that 
might contribute to rebuilding rates, they cast doubt on 
the assumption that the underlying characteristics of 
neighborhoods where schools have been rebuilt and closed 
are completely dissimilar.  It seems unlikely that any of 
these subtle differences would completely account for the 
vast difference in rebuilding rates, especially at the smallest 
geography.
 A detailed regression, including these and other vari-
ables, would help to reveal the extent to which a reopened 
school influences residential rebuilding.  In addition to the 
demographic characteristics noted above, other factors that 
might influence the decision to rebuild around a parochial 
school might include neighborhood physical disorder (which 
may or may not mirror the physical condition or status of the 
school), neighborhood attachment, and religious affiliations.  
Neighborhood physical disorder would be relatively easy to 
measure through field study.  Neighborhood attachment and 
religious affiliation data would have to be obtained through 
a survey of pre-Katrina residents, a particularly difficult 
task with the resident displacement in the post-storm 
environment.
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Case Study: New Orleans East Parochial Schools
 As part of the 2006 Pastoral Plan, the Archdiocese 
decided to consolidate four elementary schools in New 
Orleans East into one campus that would also serve children 
from two other parishes that did not have their own schools 
prior to the storm.  Elementary education in the almost 
universally flooded eastern portion of the city went from a 
neighborhood to a regional scale.  The 2008 Pastoral Plan 
recently confirmed that Resurrection of Our Lord will con-
tinue to serve elementary education needs in New Orleans 
East while the other schools remain closed.  
Campus Selection
 In the other four cases of centralized elementary 
schools, church officials picked a campus with minimal flood 
damage to serve students from schools that experienced 
more significant flooding.  Together, these movements 
moved Catholic elementary education west, to centralize it 
in the center city and along the river where the population 
was expected to rebound most quickly.  These relocations 
were expedient and pragmatic given the precarious financial 
position of the Archdiocese and the uncertain future of many 
neighborhoods.
 If there was a gambit in the centralization plan, it 
could be found in New Orleans East.  Instead of central-
izing operations at the least damaged campus on the 
western edge of the neighborhood, St. Paul the Apostle, 
the Archdiocese opted for one of the devastated campuses 
with an appropriately symbolic name: Resurrection of Our 
Lord.  While both campuses experienced hurricane wind 
damage, the map of flood depths shows that St. Paul the 
Apostle did not sustain any flood damage.  The Resurrection 
of Lord campus, in contrast, experienced significant flooding 
comparable with the other schools it replaced. 
FIGURE 5.2 Resurrection of Our Lord was rebuilt to serve as the 
centralized parochial elementary school for New Orleans East.
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Facility Characteristics
 Finally, while it does not appear that physical design 
considerations played a significant role in the selection of the 
central campus, it is worth noting how similar the flooded 
campuses are in structure and orientation to their respective 
neighborhoods.  All of the school buildings are single story, 
masonry structures.  Immaculate Heart of Mary opened in 
1954, Resurrection of Our Lord opened in 1963, and St. Simon 
Peter opened in 1986.
 The schools and churches are embedded in predomi-
nantly residential neighborhoods.  Unlike older parishes in 
the central city, the locations are not prominent or along 
primary thoroughfares.  The campuses are only encountered 
by those with local business or residence in the surrounding 
neighborhood.
 Ostensibly to support rebuilding efforts and serve 
as a catalyst for recovery, the choice made sense for other 
reasons.  In a large area that experienced nearly universal 
flooding, it made sense to follow central place theory: 
the Resurrection of Our Lord campus is the central school 
campus on an east-west axis.  Additionally, the Resurrection 
campus offered a significantly larger capacity (~350 
students), and therefore a better ability to serve students 
from multiple campuses, than either St. Paul the Apostle 
(~200 students) or St. Simon Peter (~250 students).  St. Paul 
the Apostle, although not significantly damaged, lacks the 
proximity to a predominantly residential neighborhood that 
is often critical to a successful parish. The Immaculate Heart 
of Mary campus had a similar capacity to the Resurrection 
campus, but sustained a similar level of damage and does 
not occupy a central location in New Orleans East.
Socioeconomic Characteristics
 Finally, a quick examination of the socioeconomic 
characteristics reveals other potential motivations.  The 
least damaged campus of the four, St. Paul the Apostle, is 
Census
Tract Population
School
Age (2005)
Median
Household 
Income
Families
In
Poverty Renters Owners
Median
Home 
Value
No
Mortgage
Resurrection of Our Lord 17.23 5564 22.7% $39,049 8.0% 14.9% 85.1% $79,100 21.1%
Immaculate Heart of Mary 17.2 4972 25.4% $36,387 15.7% 36.2% 63.8% $70,500 17.2%
St. Simon Peter 17.38 9931 28.9% $37,120 22.0% 33.2% 66.8% $81,400 6.6%
St. Paul the Apostle 17.33 1865 24.2% $14,583 48.0% 74.6% 25.4% $54,500 65.7%
TABLE 5.6 New Orleans East Parochial Elementary School Parishes: Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics
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also located in the most economically depressed area.   The 
Resurrection campus, on the other hand, benefits from a 
neighborhood with the highest median household income, 
rates of homeownership, and median home value, along with 
the lowest family poverty rate.  The Archdiocese undoubtedly 
maintains records about weekly alms collections and parish 
membership and it is fair to assume that these statistics 
would strongly reflect these socioeconomic characteristics.
Selection Effects
 Given the similar socioeconomic and physical design 
profiles, it is particularly interesting to look at the pace of 
rebuilding in the surrounding neighborhoods.  Like the 
aggregate data, the highest rate of residential rebuilding 
can be found in immediate proximity to the school that has 
reopened, Resurrection of Our Lord.  However, Immaculate 
Heart of Mary does not exactly follow the overall pattern of 
declining rebuilding rates as the analytical radius gets closer 
to the school and St. Simon Peter is an extreme case with 
lower than average rates of rebuilding.  Keeping their similar 
socioeconomic profiles in mind, potential reasons for these 
discrepancies are explored below to shed light on some of 
the other factors influencing residential rebuilding.
 
Status
Rebuilding Rate
School
Age (2005)
Median
Household
Income
Families
In 
Poverty Rent Own
Median
Home 
Value
No
Mortgage1/2 mi 1/4 mi 1/10 mi
Resurrection of Our Lord Open 57.90% 51.80% 67.30% 22.70% $39,049 8.00% 14.90% 85.10% $79,100 21.10%
Immaculate Heart of Mary Closed 56.60% 39.80% 54.90% 25.40% $36,387 15.70% 36.20% 63.80% $70,500 17.20%
St. Simon Peter Closed 39.80% 37.40% 0.00% 28.90% $37,120 22.00% 33.20% 66.80% $81,400 6.60%
TABLE 5.7 New Orleans East Substantially Damaged Parochial Elementary Schools
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FIGURE 5.2 Resurrection of Our Lord is the only substantially flood-damaged campus the Archdiocese has rebuilt so far.
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Status
Rebuilding Rate
School
Age (2005)
Median
Household
Income
Families
In 
Poverty Rent Own
Median
Home 
Value
No
Mortgage1/2 mi 1/4 mi 1/10 mi
Resurrection of Our Lord Open 57.90% 51.80% 67.30% 22.70% $39,049 8.00% 14.90% 85.10% $79,100 21.10%
TABLE 5.8 Resurrection of Our Lord: Neighborhood Characteristics
Resurrection of Our Lord
 The area around Resurrection of Our Lord developed 
after a portion of Bayou Sauvage was filled in during the mid-
1800s and eventually became Chef Menteur Highway, which 
now borders the neighborhood to the south.  Residential 
development occurred primarily during the 1950s into the 
early 1960s.
 The neighborhood enjoys relatively close proximity 
to pre-Katrina regional shopping and recreational opportuni-
ties, developed partly in response to the fast pace of the 
original residential development.  The Plaza Shopping Center 
was recently designated as one of the city’s 17 targeted 
recovery zones and expects substantial commercial reinvest-
ment going forward.  Joe Brown Park, the only regional park 
in New Orleans East, reopened in the summer of 2007 and 
provides a wide range of recreational opportunities.  While 
neither of these areas fall within the radii of analysis, they are 
close enough to positively influence residential redevelop-
ment around Resurrection of Our Lord while being too far 
from Immaculate Heart of Mary and St. Simon Peter to exert 
substantial influence on their redevelopment.
 There are only residential land uses in the immediate 
vicinity of the Resurrection of Our Lord.  In addition to being 
open to serve the students that attended the school, a public 
school that did not reopen until fall 2007, Schaumburg 
Elementary, falls within the radii of analysis.  Resurrection of 
Our Lord therefore provided an educational option during 
the 2006-2007 school year for children that previously 
attended Schaumburg, making it easier for their families to 
return.
FIGURE 5.3 Many of the houses situated around the perimeter of the 
school, with a view of the campus, have been rebuilt.
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FIGURE 5.4 This aerial photo shows the neighborhood surrounding Resurrection of Our Lord within a quarter mile radius.
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FIGURE 5.5 This map shows permit activity associated with residential lots (greens and yellows, lightest colors) within tenth, quarter, and half mile radii 
drawn around Resurrection of Our Lord.
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FIGURE 5.6 Neighborhood residents express their desire for the Archdiocese to rebuild Immaculate Heart of Mary through messages on the door.
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Status
Rebuilding Rate
School
Age (2005)
Median
Household
Income
Families
In 
Poverty Rent Own
Median
Home 
Value
No
Mortgage1/2 mi 1/4 mi 1/10 mi
Immaculate Heart of Mary Closed 56.60% 39.80% 54.90% 25.40% $36,387 15.70% 36.20% 63.80% $70,500 17.20%
TABLE 5.8 Immaculate Heart of Mary: Neighborhood Characteristics
Immaculate Heart of Mary
 The Pines Village neighborhood was developed by 
Sigmund Pines in the 1950s during one of the first phases 
of construction in New Orleans East, closest to the central 
city.  Similar to Resurrection of Our Lord and St. Simon Peter, 
Immaculate Heart of Mary is located in a predominantly 
residential neighborhood.  However, unlike the other two 
neighborhoods, the neighborhood around Immaculate Heart 
of Mary is immediately adjacent to other land uses that may 
be influencing its redevelopment.
 The high rates found at a half mile and tenth mile 
radius may be related to non-residential land uses that 
have returned.  Commercial and industrial activity may be 
having a positive effect at a half mile radius from the school.  
Commercial activity along Chef Menteur Highway was largely 
unaffected by the flooding and has returned.  Industrial 
uses along Downman Road and the Industrial Canal were 
impacted by the flood, but many bounced back quickly.  
Recreational activity may also be having a positive effect 
at a tenth mile radius.  There is a large neighborhood park 
immediately adjacent to the school campus.  These areas 
provide shopping, employment, and recreational opportuni-
ties for Pines Village residents immediately adjacent to and 
a short distance from the Immaculate Heart of Mary School 
and may be having important effects on rebuilding in the 
neighborhood.  
FIGURE 5.7 Access to a park may also encourage rebuilding. FIGURE 5.8 Rebuilding activity adjacent to the park and school.
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FIGURE 5.9 This aerial photo shows the neighborhood surrounding Immaculate Heart of Mary within a quarter mile radius.
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FIGURE 5.10 This map shows permit activity associated with residential lots (greens and yellows, lightest colors) within tenth, quarter, and half mile radii 
drawn around Immaculate Heart of Mary.
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FIGURE 5.11 St. Simon Peter has been boarded up in anticipation of a long closure.
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Status
Rebuilding Rate
School
Age (2005)
Median
Household
Income
Families
In 
Poverty Rent Own
Median
Home 
Value
No
Mortgage1/2 mi 1/4 mi 1/10 mi
St. Simon Peter Closed 39.80% 37.40% 0.00% 28.90% $37,120 22.00% 33.20% 66.80% $81,400 6.60%
TABLE 5.10 St. Simon Peter: Neighborhood Characteristics
St. Simon Peter
 The area around St. Simon Peter was originally 
developed as fishing camps along Lake Pontchartrain, giving 
it a rural character.  The land was drained for agricultural 
development in the 1920s.  The rural character is still evident 
on the large plot of undeveloped land adjacent to St. Simon 
Peter church and school.  Residential subdivision develop-
ment began in earnest in the 1960s as part of the second 
major construction period in New Orleans.
 Rebuilding around St. Simon Peter has lagged behind 
both Immaculate Heart of Mary and Resurrection of Our Lord. 
It is the furthest out and most isolated from other develop-
ment, near the eastern edge of the city.  Unlike the areas 
around the other two campuses, the zoning map reveals no 
significant commercial development or recreational areas in 
close proximity to the school and both these factors may be 
inhibiting residential redevelopment.  There are no employ-
ment or shopping centers in the immediate vicinity.
 The residential development surrounding the other 
two schools is characterized exclusively by single and two 
family residential structures.  The residential development 
around St. Simon Peter is dominated by a multifamily 
residential complex, consisting of many units, immediately 
adjacent to the school that has not yet been redeveloped.  Its 
contribution to neighborhood physical disorder and uncer-
tain future may also affect rebuilding activity in the area.
FIGURE 5.12 A large multifamily development is adjacent to the school. FIGURE 5.13 Some of the neighborhood has never been developed.
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FIGURE 5.14 This aerial photo shows the neighborhood surrounding St. Simon Peter within a quarter mile radius.
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FIGURE 5.15 This map shows permit activity associated with residential lots (greens and yellows, lightest colors) within tenth, quarter, and half mile radii 
drawn around St. Simon Peter.
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 Given the state of current real estate, sociology, and 
urban design research relevant to the relationship between 
schools and their surrounding neighborhoods, the correla-
tion between an open school and a high concentration of 
residential rebuilding efforts within a neighborhood is not 
surprising.  The proximity and accessibility of a good quality, 
well-maintained parochial school with community facilities 
and a strong social network could be predicted to be a 
powerful draw.  
 In a post-disaster environment, people are looking 
for signs and symbols to help them make decisions about 
whether and where to return.  The decisions of friends, 
families, and neighbors are important, but local government 
can help by indicating which areas are worthy of investment 
through investments of its own in infrastructure.  Schools, 
given their social network component, are especially 
important among the infrastructure elements controlled by 
local government.  Compared with police and fire stations, 
libraries, public parks, and cultural facilities, schools are the 
most common and visible government facilities in residential 
neighborhood.  Only streets and sewerage water infrastruc-
ture are more common, but they are arguably less visible.
Visibility is important, as Nobel prize-winning economist 
Thomas Schelling notes that citizens are looking for “credible 
commitments” from government that the city is a safe place 
to come back to (Gosselin 2005).  The levees and hurricane 
protection are first on most citizens’ lists, but schools aren’t 
far behind.  Without exception, the restoration of neighbor-
hood schools was been mentioned as a critical piece in all of 
the post-Katrina community planning processes.
 The restoration of the local school is important 
because it represents a vote of confidence in the neighbor-
hood.  For most residents, the school is at least symbolic in 
this way.  For families with children, the school has an equally 
important functional value.  New Orleans had a rich tradition 
of neighborhood-based public schools, even if it had few 
modern multifunctional schools with community facilities.  
Family allegiance to a neighborhood typically extended to 
the local school as well.  Most families are still inclined to 
have their children attend school close to home (Robelen 
2008).  “For a lot of people in New Orleans, that’s still the 
default setting.  People are very tied to their neighborhoods,” 
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observes Mickey Landry, principal of Lafayette Academy 
Charter School (ibid).
 This presents a challenge in the new predominantly 
charter public school system that knows no neighborhood 
boundaries.  Any child anywhere in the city may attend any 
school he is admitted to.  No spaces are reserved for students 
in close proximity who might walk or bike to school.  Instead, 
pupils are bused all over the city to their schools of choice.  
Of course, none of the schools opened so far are in close 
proximity to children that have returned to substantially 
flood damaged neighborhoods.  In these areas, it seems 
especially important to return to the neighborhood school 
model.  If these facilities don’t serve the needs of neighbor-
hood residents and their children, there will be less incentive 
to cluster development around them.
Clustering
 The data indicates that residential rebuilding 
activity is clustering around Catholic schools where they 
have reopened.  Catholic schools enjoyed several distinct 
advantages over public schools pre-Katrina.  The system 
offered better academic performance, but more importantly 
the social network and capital embodied in the church 
parish.  A tight social fabric made repair of the physical fabric 
possible and practical.  Parochial schools came closest to 
the idea of community schools advanced in current urban 
design as they were generally paired with churches and 
other multifunctional parish facilities.  The programmatic 
and physical overhaul of public schools in post-Katrina New 
Orleans, however, holds the promise of improvement in all 
these areas.
 The future of schools in Orleans Parish has been 
pondered by experts and residents in the context of 
numerous planning processes and it is safe to say that the 
long term vision is quite different from the reality that has 
emerged from Katrina’s exigency.  The first effort came from 
a panel of experts assembled by the Urban Land Institute in 
November 2005.  The panel, in its advice to the Mayor’s Bring 
New Orleans Back Commission, focused on land use and said 
little about the future of school facilities, although it tacitly 
endorsed the community school concept.
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 Building on the panel’s efforts, the Bring New Orleans 
Back Commission designed a neighborhood center to serve 
as a model for rebuilding communities.  The model advocates 
for two small elementary schools at sub-centers, within a 
comfortable walking distance for all children, as part of its 
guidelines for a sustainable neighborhood for eleven thou-
sand people.
 In contrast to the first two efforts, the Danzey-
Lambert plan made the gathering of community input 
central to its planning process for flooded neighborhoods.  
With few exceptions, individual neighborhoods prioritized 
restoration of their local schools, second only to the reopen-
ing of supermarkets and pharmacies (22).  In a survey ranking 
fears about returning, 27 percent of residents cited access to 
schools – a higher rate than those concerned about jobs (Lee 
2006, 2).
 Finally, the Unified New Orleans Plan asked residents 
from all over the city how to approach rebuilding infra-
structure.  When it came to schools, Community Congress 
participants expressed support for reconstruction based 
on neighborhood repopulation and recovery rates and 
endorsed the community school (multifunctional community 
centers) model (15).  The plan advocates for the establish-
ment of community centers on school campuses.  Schools 
should first be rebuilt in low risk areas, then in moderate 
risk areas, and finally buildings in high risk areas should be 
relocated (100).  
 Clustered development around schools should be 
encouraged and carefully considered in the planning of 
public school facilities because of the advantages it offers 
to both the city and its residents.  Since the storm, the city 
has enjoyed steadily increased tax receipts, thanks to a long 
overdue property tax reassessment and sales tax proceeds 
from durable good replacement and reconstruction activity.  
Along with post-storm staff cuts, the city has been able 
to continue providing services residents expect like twice 
weekly trash collection and emergency response at similar 
levels, albeit at a much higher cost per capita.  City officials 
acknowledge that the practice is inefficient and unsustain-
able, but have offered no solution or preview of what is to 
come.  It is clear that the city will ultimately be incapable of 
provide these services at such low densities across the entire 
pre-Katrina footprint.  Once tax receipts decline to a normal, 
stable level, difficult decisions will have to be made.
 Policymakers have been looking for ways to cluster 
development and create pockets of density, examining 
property buyouts and land swap opportunities.  Perhaps 
master planning for the New Orleans Public School system 
could provide part of the desired solution.  Rather than 
simply trying to respond to demand, facility decisions should 
be made with an eye towards the future layout of the city 
and recognition that residential development may cluster 
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next to improved public schools.  Yet, there is no institutional 
framework for planning land use and school facilities togeth-
er and no requirement for the individual entities involved to 
consult (Vincent 2006, 434).  In order for new schools to be 
developed as the center of residential neighborhoods, school 
facility planners must work with city planners to achieve the 
goal of new facilities that act as true, multifunctional com-
munity centers open to all neighborhood residents.  Schools, 
as the one of the few types of infrastructure with a social 
network component, can help repair both the physical and 
social fabric.
 Like the parochial school system, the public school 
system will not be able to rebuild or restore all its facilities 
in the near future.  While insufficient funds are partly to 
blame, local officials also recognize that there may never be 
sufficient demand to warrant reopening schools in some 
neighborhoods.  The Archdiocese strategy of centralizing 
elementary schools might be relevant to the public school 
system.  A similar thought process about which facilities can 
be brought up to speed most quickly, along with actual and 
projected neighborhood recovery should govern the public 
school facilities planning process.  From the city’s perspec-
tive, a strong argument can be made for centralizing facility 
investments closest to the least vulnerable areas in the center 
of the city.  
 The bottom line is that government can and should 
incentivize residential rebuilding in selected areas through 
infrastructure investments, in order to achieve its goal of 
clustered development.  Even those in favor of a free market 
approach to rebuilding acknowledge that the market needs 
information to function properly.  Local government has 
misled some residents by announcing that recovery projects 
will follow private investment – there simply isn’t enough 
money to go around.  The hard decisions about which neigh-
borhoods will receive investment have only been postponed. 
School investments could send a clear signal about which 
neighborhoods the city believes can and should be resettled.  
Strong public schools will help to concentrate residential 
development, enhance property values and thereby increase 
property tax revenues, making the efficient delivery of city 
services to clusters financially possible.
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Directions for Future Research
 Although the GIS analysis used in this study suggests 
a connection between neighborhood schools and residential 
rebuilding, further research is needed to determine the 
strength of the correlation and extent of a school’s influence.  
There are a lot of unknowns in emerging research about 
rebuilding in New Orleans.  How does one measure who has 
returned?  What factors are involved in making individual 
decisions to return?  What is the role of community institu-
tions and municipal government?  What finally prompts a 
decision to be made?  How can we create a framework for 
understanding the rebuilding process?
 Ideally, a study of schools would be able to control 
for these unknowns and answer all these questions.  As it 
is, it is exceedingly difficult to definitively determine the 
wide range of factors and the relative importance of each 
in individual rebuilding decisions.  A survey format might 
be the best way to assess the influence of a neighborhood 
school until some of these questions can be answered.  
Leading questions might include a list of known factors in 
the rebuilding decision and ask respondents to rank them in 
order of importance.  Alternatively, an open-ended survey or 
interview format might ask residents what factors influenced 
their decision to rebuild or not, to gauge the importance of a 
local school without suggesting it.  
However, it would be difficult to successfully survey a statisti-
cally valid sample of neighborhood residents.  While it would 
be relatively easy to reach residents that have returned, 
it would likely be difficult to locate residents that are still 
displaced to learn their motivations for staying put elsewhere 
and what factors might have led them to return to their 
home in New Orleans.
 The method employed in this analysis might be 
utilized again after public school decisions are made.  It 
would be interesting to see, for instance, if there is a spike in 
building permit activity once the futures of flooded public 
school campuses are announced.  A comparison of building 
permit activity six months prior to the announcement and 
six months after might be telling.  If there is an increase in 
building permit activity, that would signal that the significant 
portion of the market has been waiting for information, even 
if it does not yield a higher rate of rebuilding around schools 
that are scheduled to reopen.
 The city is just now getting to the point, approaching 
three years after the post-Katrina flooding, where most final 
decisions have been made and meaningful research about 
rates of rebuilding and return can be conducted.  Schools 
appear to be an important part of the equation that merits 
further inquiry.
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Conclusion
 Approaching three years after post-Katrina levee 
failures flooded New Orleans, the recovery is moving along.  
The free market approach to rebuilding has led to uneven 
redevelopment across the city with scattered pockets of 
density.  Billions of dollars in private insurance proceeds are 
still waiting on the sidelines as homeowners try to make final 
decisions about whether and where to rebuild there homes.  
Local government, meanwhile, hopes that future develop-
ment is clustered in order to provide city services more 
efficiently, but has taken no action to further this goal.
For New Orleanians looking for “credible commitments” 
from government before they decide to rebuild, there is no 
more omnipresent symbol than the neighborhood school.  
A unique type of infrastructure with both physical and 
social dimensions, rebuilding schools can contribute to the 
restoration of the multiple networks needed for a successful 
recovery.  
 Although this analysis does not support the hypoth-
esis that there would be higher overall rates of rebuilding 
in neighborhoods around schools that have reopened than 
those around schools that remain closed, it suggests that 
the location of rebuilding activity may be affected by school 
status.  All the neighborhoods studied are being rebuilt to 
similar degrees, but there is increasing rebuilding activity, as 
measured through the issuance of residential building per-
mits, with decreasing distance to a school that has reopened.  
The exact opposite relationship exists with schools that have 
not and are not scheduled to reopen.  
 Of course, there are many other factors in individual 
property owners’ decisions to rebuild, leaving some uncer-
tainty about the extent to which schools may be influencing 
rebuilding patterns.  As the public schools belatedly embark 
upon their own long term rebuilding strategy, they should 
consider the urban design implications for the future of 
New Orleans.  If city government is serious about clustering 
development in substantially flooded neighborhoods, the 
public school system should pick and choose the campuses 
it intends to rebuild carefully.  Existing market demand for 
public education should only be one consideration as the 
reopening of schools seems likely to spur development in 
their surrounding neighborhoods.  
 Given the uncertainty about the catalytic effect of 
a school in and of itself, and the experience of Archdiocese 
schools with a stronger social network, new and rebuilt 
public schools should designed as multifunctional cen-
terpieces of the community that serve all neighborhood 
residents, not just families with children.  The reconstruction 
of schools presents an excellent opportunity to reintroduce 
social and physical and mental health services to communi-
ties.  Community schools may also function as community 
  85
centers through the provision of other public facilities, like 
libraries, and recreational opportunities.  Schools are at least 
partially responsible for driving redevelopment in some 
residential neighborhoods and present an opportunity to 
create neighborhood centers that are even more capable of 
guiding future rebuilding activity in New Orleans.
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 A phone call with Larry Vale placed from 
a Super Wal-Mart parking lot in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee in early September 2005 ultimately led me 
to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
here at MIT to advance and reflect on the recovery of 
New Orleans.  I am grateful for all the opportunities 
I have had to do just that over the past two years, 
thanks to the tireless efforts of faculty like Larry, Karl 
Seidman, and J. Phillip Thompson.
 Not long after that first advisory session, 
I was cleaning out my family home in Lakeview, 
contemplating its future along with that of the neigh-
borhood.  A few people had come back to survey 
their property, but most left immediately.  Some roads 
were still impassable and basic utilities had not yet 
been restored.  Yet, a little over a mile away, genera-
tors were humming and contractors were working 
to reopen Mount Carmel Academy, a Catholic high 
school for girls.  It was truly amazing and inspiring and 
that is where this story began.
 In the production of this thesis, I would like to 
thank J. Mark Schuster for his interest in this topic and 
encouragement throughout the preparation of the 
proposal.  Larry and Karl provided valuable freedom, 
insight, advice, and understanding along the way 
and helped me always see both the forest and the 
trees.  Jeffrey Schwartz has worked alongside me the 
whole way; he made green tea, listened to Bruce, and 
routinely stayed up later than I did.
--Seth Knudsen, May 2008
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